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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
...Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ...Discoveries
.... "I Pursuant to this Constitutional authorization, Congress enacted
the federal patent laws2 under which the owner of a patent is granted the
"right to exclude others from making, using, or selling [the patented]
invention throughout the United States" for a period of seventeen years.3
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Codified at Title 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
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In return for this limited monopoly, the inventor must disclose to the
public methods by which one skilled in the art can make and use the
patented invention.4 This quid pro quo arrangement encourages techno-
logical innovation by benefitting the inventor with exclusive rights in his
patented device while providing new ideas to others who can, in turn,
develop them further.
In order for an inventor to receive patent protection, however, he
must first meet several conditions set forth by Congress. Two of these
prerequisites are: (1) that the invention be new and "useful";5 and (2)
that the invention not have been "on sale" or in "public use" within the
United States more than one year prior to the filing of the application for
patent.6 The former is commonly referred to as the "utility" requirement
of the patent law.7 The latter are known, respectively, as the "on sale"
and "public use" bars to patentability.' Specifically, if an inventor is
found to have transgressed the on sale or public use provisions of section
102(b), he will be forever denied the right to receive a patent for the
offending invention. The "critical date,"9 the date one year prior to the
inventor's filing of his application for patent, is decisive in this regard.
It is therefore particularly important that the inventor not place his
device on sale or in public use prior to the critical date if he wishes to
preserve the right to a patent for his invention.
The dilemma posed by these prerequisites to patentability is that
there exists an intrinsic tension between the requirement of utility, on
one hand, and the on sale and public use bars on the other. This tension
is clearly illustrated when the invention sought to be patented involves
the design and testing of pharmaceutical compositions, medical devices,
and environmentally dependent inventions ("EDIs") generally. The
term "environmentally dependent invention" is used throughout this
Comment to refer to any of a class of patentable devices or compositions
4. Id. § 112.
5. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
6. "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... (b) the invention was.., in public use or
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States ..... Id. § 102(b) (emphasis added).
7. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1966). See generally Note, The Utility
Requirement in the Patent Law, 53 GEo. L.J. 154 (1964).
8. See Moleculon Research Corp v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987). See generally William C. Rooklidge & W. Gerard von Hoffman
III, Reduction to Practice, Experimental Use, and the "On Sale" and "Public Use" Bars to
Patentability, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 1 (1988).
9. Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The




which vary in effectiveness and result depending upon their operative
setting (i.e., working environment). Such devices are to be distinguished
from strictly "autonomous" inventions which tend to function in a con-
sistent and efficacious manner irrespective of their surrounding environ-
ment or setting.
The inventor of an environmentally dependent invention finds him-
self caught in a Catch-22; he must adequately test his invention to
demonstrate its utility and effectiveness without placing it on sale or in
public use more than one year prior to his application for patent.
Although this may not appear to be a problem for inventors of autono-
mous inventions, experimentation involving EDIs, because of their very
nature, often emulates the statutorily proscribed on sale or public use
activities. Such inventions typically require some form of public testing
to establish and adequately demonstrate the utility required by section
101. For example, a pharmaceutical composition must generally be
tested on a group of individuals (i.e., members of the public at large)
before it can be proven effective for the treatment of disease in humans
and thus sufficiently "useful" to be patentable for that purpose.' 0
To deal with this dilemma, courts have adopted an "experimental
use" doctrine," whereby experimental use of an invention for the pur-
pose of bringing it to perfection negates the on sale and public use
bars.12 Application of this doctrine by the courts, however, has proven
inadequate towards resolving the inherent statutory tension between sec-
tions 101 and 102(b). As a result, both inventors and patent attorneys
have very little guidance concerning when to file patent applications for
EDIs. An indirect consequence of this uncertainty is that, contrary to
Constitutional mandate, progress in the sciences and useful arts is
discouraged.
This Comment discusses pertinent precedent of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit")13 with
regard to both the utility requirement of section 101 and the on sale and
10. See infra note 31.
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877); see also discussion infra part
II.B.3.
12. See Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 137; T.P. Labs., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d
965, 971 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
13. The Federal Circuit was created under the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)).
Effective October 1, 1982, the jurisdiction of the regional circuit courts of appeals was transferred
to the Federal Circuit over appeals from U.S. district court cases arising under the federal patent,
copyright, and trademark laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). In addition,
the Federal Circuit hears all appeals by patent applicants from adverse decisions of the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences of the Patent and Trademark Office. See id. § 1295(a)(4). One
of the primary Congressional goals in granting the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals in patent cases was to establish uniformity and certainty in the area of patent law. See S.
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public use bars of section 102(b). An emphasis is placed on the law as it
relates to the testing of EDIs generally.
Part II provides a rudimentary understanding of the patent law con-
cept of "utility" so that the reader may begin to understand the problems
created when the utility requirement is considered in conjunction with
the on sale and public use bars of section 102(b). Emphasis is placed on
chemical and pharmaceutical compositions for two reasons. First,
chemical compositions, in general, are recognized as one of the more
problematic categories in the area of utility.14 Second, pharmaceutical
compounds are paradigmatic EDIs and will thus best serve to illuminate
the points made throughout this Comment.
The Federal Circuit's application of the on sale and public use bars
of section 102(b) and the judicially created experimental use doctrine are
detailed in Part III. Several of the court's decisions-which address a
variety of EDIs-have been selected for discussion in order to illustrate
some of the inconsistencies in the court's application of the statutory
bars and the experimental use doctrine. It is hoped that the reader will
acquire a greater appreciation of the types of problems faced by inven-
tors of EDIs who, as a necessary prerequisite to patent protection, seek
to establish their inventions' practical utility through various methods of
public experimentation. Additionally, Part III examines various factors
underlying the court's apparent failure to equitably and predictably
apply the experimental use doctrine.
Part IV endeavors to cut to the heart of the intrinsic tension
between the utility requirement of section 101 and the on sale and public
use bars of section 102(b), placing particular emphasis on the impact to
inventors of EDIs.
The purported policy considerations underlying section 102(b) and
the reasons behind the statute's failure to effectively realize those poli-
cies are discussed in Part V. Finally, a proposal for statutory reforma-
tion of section 102(b) is set forth with the intent of achieving the
Constitutional goal of promoting the progress of science and the useful
arts, 15 while remaining faithful to the policies underlying the statutory
bars of section 102(b).'
6
REP. No. 275,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15-16; H.R. REP. No.
312, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 20-23 (1981).
14. See 1 DONALD S. CHiSUM, PATENTS §§ 4.01-02, at 4-2, 4-3 (rel. 42, 1992) ("The problem
of finding a sufficient [utility] is encountered most often with chemical compounds and
processes."). For a discussion of the utility requirement of section 101 as it relates specifically to
pharmaceutical compositions, see generally Deborah H. Brand, Utility in a Pharmaceutical
Patent, 39 FOOD DRuo CosM. L.J. 480 (1984).
15. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See discussion infra part V.A.
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II. THE "UTILITY" REQUIREMENT OF 35 U.S.C. § 101
A. The Basic Concept of Utility
The utility requirement in patent law is set forth at 35 U.S.C. § 101,
which states: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor .... In
other words, one may only patent that which is deemed "useful.'" To
be minimally useful within the meaning of section 101, the invention
must "(1) be operable and capable of use, i.e., it must perform a
designed function; (2) achieve some minimum human purpose; and (3)
that purpose must not be illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy."'19
Commercial usefulness, however, to the extent that the invention is com-
mercially salable in the marketplace, is not a prerequisite of utility under
section 101.20 In addition to fulfilling the utility requirement, the inven-
tor must further satisfy the disclosure requirement of section 112.21 The
inventor's disclosure, which includes a statement of practical utility
made within the patent application, must describe the invention in suffi-
cient detail to enable one skilled in the art to which the invention per-
tains to make and use the invention as of its filing date.
22
B. Utility of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Compositions
The utility requirement, as it pertains to chemical processes, was
directly addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the seminal
case of Brenner v. Manson.23 At issue in Brenner was the utility of a
chemical process found to produce a particular steroid that demonstrated
a tumor-inhibiting effect in mice. In affirming the Patent and Trade-
marks Office's finding that the inventor had failed to produce sufficient
evidence of utility, the Court set forth its rationale for requiring a clear
showing of specific utility:
[A] process patent in the chemical field, which has not been devel-
oped and pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly
17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
18. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1966). The Court, however, noted that such a
simple word as "useful" can be "pregnant with ambiguity when applied to the facts of life." Id. at
529.
19. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1101-02 (D. Del. 1987)
(citing 1 CHisut, supra note 14, § 4.04[l]), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
20. Application of Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Application of Anthony,
414 F.2d 1383, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
22. See Application of Glass, 492 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1974); 1 CHISUM, supra note 14,
§ 4.04, at 4-24, 4-25.
23. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
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of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly commanded by
[section 101]. Until the process claim has been reduced to production
of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monop-
oly are not capable of precise delineation. It may engross a vast,
unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer
power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without
compensating benefit to the public. The basic quid pro quo contem-
plated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and devel-
oped to this point-where specific benefit exists in currently avail-
able form-there is insufficient justification for permitting an
applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.
* . . [A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the
search, but compensation for its successful conclusion. "[A] patent
system must be related to the real world of commerce rather than to
the realm of philosophy .... 24
The Court's principal concern was that if the inventor were permit-
ted to receive a patent on a chemical process, whose specific utility had
not been narrowed within the patent application to a particular use or
function, then the inventor could unjustifiably control a monopoly over
all possible uses of that process, including both those known at the time
of filing and those yet to be discovered. For this reason, the court made
clear that an invention's demonstrable and substantial utility must be set
forth with specificity within the application for patent in order to satisfy
the useful (i.e., utility) requirement of section 101.
1. MANIFESTATION OF UTILITY THROUGH CLINICAL TESTING
That an inventor must designate his invention's specific utility
within the application for patent means that inventors of pharmaceutical
compositions (and medical devices generally) typically need to perform
some form of preliminary clinical testing. These tests ordinarily involve
human subjects where the composition is to be utilized solely for the
treatment of human disease.25 Under certain circumstances, however,
clinical testing on humans is not necessary and in vivo (i.e., on lab ani-
mals) or in vitro (i.e., in an artificial environment such as a test tube)
testing may be sufficient to establish the practical utility required by
section 101.26 This particular issue was addressed, and at least partially
24. Id. at 534-36 (footnotes and citations omitted).
25. See infra note 31.
26. See infra note 29.
[Vol. 49:185
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resolved, by the Federal Circuit in Cross v. Iizuka. 27
In Cross, the Federal Circuit's most notable decision concerning
the utility of pharmaceutical compositions, the court held, on the facts of
the case,28 that in vitro29 utility was sufficient to establish the practical
utility required by section 101. The invention at issue in the interference
proceeding was an imidazole derivative compound used to inhibit the
synthesis of thromboxane synthesase from human or bovine platelet
microsomes. The challenging party (Cross), in an attempt to convince
the court that lizuka's claimed compound lacked practical utility at the
time its priority application was filed, argued that the minimum level of
utility disclosed in a patent application claiming a pharmaceutical com-
pound must be directed to in vivo utility to satisfy the practical utility
requirement of section 101. The court, however, disagreed, recognizing
that each case involving a question of utility under section 101 must be
decided on its own unique facts and circumstances.3 0  The court con-
cluded, based upon the evidence before it, with specific emphasis on the
fact that the in vitro utility of the compound in question was supple-
mented by in vitro and in vivo activity of structurally similar compounds
(i.e., prior art), that in vitro utility was sufficient to establish utility under
section 101.31
The question raised by this case, and as of yet remaining unan-
27. 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
28. Id. at 1051 ("Today, under the circumstances of the instant case .... in vitro utility is
sufficient to comply with the practical utility requirement of § 101.").
29. In vitro refers to an environment outside a living organism, such as a test tube or culture,
whereas in vivo refers to an environment within a living organism, such as an animal or a plant.
Id. at 1043 n.6.
30. Id. at 1048.
31. The initial determination, however, as to whether an invention possesses practical utility
for purposes of section 101 is made by the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). Although the
PTO is bound by decisions of the Federal Circuit, its application of the utility requirement in
practice tends to be more rigorous than that of the Federal Circuit, particularly with respect to
pharmaceutical compositions. In particular, the PTO seldom finds in vitro testing by itself to be
sufficient to establish practical utility. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Klaus, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1657, 1660 (Bd.
Pat. App. & Int. 1988) (finding that practical utility had not been established where there was a
lack of correlation between in vitro tests and the treatment of arthritis); Ex Parte Maas, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d 1746, 1747-48 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987) (finding that practical utility had not been
established where there was "no correlation ... between in vitro experiments and a practical
utility in currently available form for humans or animals"). The PTO's stated position on
pharmaceutical utility as concerns clinical testing is as follows:
Proof of utility ... may be established by clinical or in vivo or in vitro data, or
combinations of these which would be convincing to those skilled in the art. More
particularly, if the utility relied on is directed solely to the treatment of humais,
evidence of utility, if required, must generally be clinical evidence although animal
tests may be adequate where the art would accept these as appropriately correlated
with human utility or where animal tests are coupled with other evidence, including
clinical evidence and a structural similarity to compounds marketed commercially
for the same indicated uses. If there is no assertion of human utility, or if there is an
19941
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swered, is whether a pharmaceutical compound, not structurally similar
to pre-existing compounds of proven in vivo utility, may, with respect to
pharmacological activity, satisfy the practical utility requirement of sec-
tion 101 following mere in vitro testing.32 The issue, however, is even
broader. Because the court deemed utility a question of fact,33 any case
involving a determination of practical utility under section 101 will be
decided on the facts and circumstances particular to that individual case.
Such fact based analysis tends to promote unpredictability and confusion
in the area of practical utility and, accordingly, stimulates increased liti-
gation over the issue. 34  This result runs counter to the basic premise
underlying the patent system-that innovation, not litigation, is to be
promoted and rewarded.
2. SAFETY AS A REQUIREMENT OF PHARMACEUTICAL UTILITY
Although an inventor must establish a specific and substantial use
for a pharmaceutical compound, he need not demonstrate its absolute
safety through a process of clinical testing in order to receive patent
protection for the invention.35 In other words, absolute safety is not a
prerequisite to a finding of utility in drugs designed for therapeutic use
in humans. All that is required is a "sufficient probability" of safety in
human therapy and such probability need not necessarily be established
assertion of animal utility, operativeness for use on standard test animals is adequate
for patent purposes.
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(p),
at 600-41 (5th ed. 1983, rev. 15, Aug. 1993) (citations omitted).
32. Thus, Cross does little to resolve the dilemma faced by inventors of pharmaceutical
compounds in determining the proper method by which to ascertain their inventions' specific
usefulness. It remains unclear when in vitro, or even in vivo, testing alone will be sufficient to
establish the practical utility of a given pharmaceutical composition. Accordingly, if such a
composition is to be utilized in the medical treatment of humans (and is so claimed in the
application for a patent), the inventor is well-advised to perform preliminary clinical testing on
human subjects (i.e., beyond mere in vivo or in vitro experimentation) in order to ensure the
compound's utility. Such testing may, however, create difficulties for the inventor when viewed
in conjunction with the public use or on sale bars of section 102(b). See infra part IV.
33. 753 F.2d at 1044 n.7 (noting, in dictum, that "[u]tility is a fact question").
34. One commentator, arguing that practical utility should properly be decided as a question
of law, has asserted that categorization of utility as a question of fact will heighten
unpredictability in the field of pharmaceutical research, thus making such risky investments even
more uncertain and speculative. See generally, Kenneth D. Sibley, Practical Utility: Evolution
Suspended, 32 J.L. & TECH. 203 (1992).
35. The position of the Patent Office with respect to the safety of pharmaceutical compounds
is:
[A] drug which is not sufficiently safe under the conditions of use for which it is
said (sic] be effective will not satisfy the utility requirement. Proof of safety shall
be required only in those cases where adequate reasons can be advanced by the
examiner for believing that the drug is unsafe, and shall be accepted if it establishes
a reasonable probability of safety.
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 31, § 608.01(p), at 600-42 (citations omitted).
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by clinical evidence of use on human subjects. 6 In fact, a pharmaceuti-
cal compound may be useful within the meaning of section 101, and
thus patentable, even though it has not yet been approved by the Food
and Drug Administration.37
III. THE "ON SALE" AND "PUBLIC USE" BARS OF 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
Of particular concern to the inventor seeking to establish, through
the process of clinical testing, a specific practical utility for a pharma-
ceutical compound or medical device are the on sale and public use bars
of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Such concerns, however, are not unique to the
field of medical inventions. They are also shared by inventors of most
types of EDIs whose inventions often require testing in the "public"
domain to ensure their practical utility.
A. Legislative History of the Statutory Bars
In the Patent Act of 1790, the earliest of the United States Patent
Acts, Congress authorized the issuance of a patent to one who had
"invented or discovered any useful art... or any improvement therein
not before known or used .... It was not until passage of the Patent
Act of 1836, however, that Congress enacted the first on sale and public
use bar provisions. 9 Congress's principal objective in implementing the
statutory bars was to prevent inventors from commercially exploiting
their inventions, and thus extending their effective monopolies, beyond
the statutory patent term prescribed by Congress.4" The bars, as set forth
in the 1836 Act, were not qualified by any grace period whatsoever.
36. See Application of Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 260 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (holding that anesthetic
efficiency tests performed on rabbits using the claimed invention established a sufficient
probability of safety in human therapy but noting that it did not mean to imply that evidence of
clinical testing should not be demanded by the Patent Office under different factual
circumstances).
37. See id.; Application of Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1393 (C.C.P.A 1969). See also
Application of Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948 (C.C.P.A. 1961). The court in Anthony explained:
Congress has given the responsibility to the FDA, not to the Patent Office, to
determine in the first instance whether drugs are sufficiently safe for use that they
can be introduced in the commercial market, under the conditions prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof ....
... [T]he FDA need not necessarily determine that a drug be commercially
useful or usable before it may be "useful" in the patent law sense.
414 F.2d at 1395.
38. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
39. See Patent Act of 1836, ch 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117. The statute provided that an inventor
could be granted a patent if his invention was "not, at the time of his application for a patent, in
public use or on sale, with his consent or allowance." Id.
40. This concern stems from the fact that the United States utilizes a first-to-invent, and not a
first-to-file, patent system. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988). Thus, if it were not for the statutory
bars, the first to invent could extend, indefinitely, a virtual monopoly over the prospective patent
1994]
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Accordingly, an inventor was required to file his application for patent
before initially placing his invention on sale or in public use. As part of
the Patent Act of 1939, however, Congress added a two year grace
period to the bars, allowing an inventor to apply for a patent within two
years after first placing his invention on sale or in public use.41 This
grace period evolved out of a Congressional recognition that an inventor
requires time to adequately perfect his invention prior to applying for a
patent.
42
In 1939, Congress reduced the statutory grace period from two
years to one year.43 The reason for this change was set forth in a Senate
Report accompanying the measure:
In 1839, when the period of 2 years was first developed, it may have
been a proper length of time for an inventor to make up his mind
whether or not to file an application for a patent. Under present con-
ditions 2 years appears unduly long and operates as a handicap to
industry. Reduction of the period would serve to bring the date of
patenting closer to the time when the invention is made, and would
expedite applications, not only in their filing but also in their progress
through the Patent Office. One year is believed to be a very fair
period for all concerned."4
Implicit in this statement is the belief that an inventor's only considera-
tion in determining when to file his application for a patent is whether he
should do so at all.
All inventions, however, are not created equally. Some devices and
compositions, by their very nature, require a period of time significantly
longer than one year to perfect.4 This is particularly true of inventions
that possess the quality of durability as an essential part of their claimed
utility46 or of inventions whose effectiveness cannot be reliably or ade-
rights in an invention, even though he himself had never filed a patent application for such an
invention.
41. See Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat 353. The Act provided in pertinent part:
[No patent shall be held to be invalid by reason of such purchase, sale, or use prior
to the application for a patent as aforesaid, except ... that such purchase, sale, or
prior use has been for more than two years prior to such application for a patent.
Id.
42. See S. REP. No. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1836).
43. See Act of August 5, 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212.
44. S. REp. No. 876, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1939); H.R. REp. No. 961, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1939).
45. See, e.g., Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877) (upholding the inventor's patent
where he had publicly tested his invention, a method of constructing pavement from wooden
blocks and tar paper, for six years prior to seeking a patent).
46. See, e.g., id.; Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990)




quately determined within a one-year period.47 . When such devices or
compositions further require that testing be performed in a public set-
ting-that is, outside of a confidential laboratory environment-the
one-year grace period, in conjunction with the public use and on sale
bars, operates in a prohibitive fashion. This presents a significant obsta-
cle for inventors of EDIs. Such inventors necessarily feel compelled to
complete their experimental testing and subsequently apply for a patent
within the one-year time frame. An inventor, however, cannot possibly
feel confident in so applying for a patent, and thus incurring the associ-
ated expenses, until he is assured that his invention will function as
intended. Accordingly, a blanket one-year bar provision for all classes
of inventions, regardless of their complexity or inherent need for
extended testing, is not truly an ideal solution to the perceived problem.
Nonetheless, the one-year blanket period for the on sale and public
use bars was carried over from the 1939 Act into the current version of
section 102(b),48 which provides in pertinent part: "A person shall be
entitled to a patent unless... (b) the invention was.., in public use or
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the appli-
cation for patent in the United States. . . .,49 Consequently, in order to
provide inventors additional time where necessary to perfect their inven-
tions, the Federal Circuit has remedially applied the experimental use
doctrine to circumvent the statutory one year mandate. In a sense, the
court is acting in a quasi-legislative fashion to repair what Congress has
not.50
B. The Federal Circuit's Application of Section 102(b)
5 1
The principles enunciated below are consistently set forth by the
Federal Circuit as generally accepted "rules" of law. It should be noted,
47. See, e.g., TP Labs., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984) (orthodontic tooth positioning appliance).
48. See Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 797.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
50. See Gerald T. Welch, Patent Law's Ephemeral Experimental Use Doctrine: Judicial Lip
Service to a Judicial Misnomer or the Experimental Stage Doctrine, 11 U. TOL. L. Rav. 865, 866
(1980).
51. This Comment makes no attempt to discuss the historical development and interpretation
of the on sale and public use bars in the United States Supreme Court and various federal circuit
and district courts prior to the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The
Federal Circuit, aside from infrequent and sporadic Supreme Court decisions, is now charged with
establishing precedent in the field of patent law. See supra note 13. Accordingly, this Comment
focuses primarily on decisions of the Federal Circuit. For detailed discussions on the historical
evolution of the bars and the experimental use doctrine generally, see William K.. West, Jr. &
Nancy J. Linck, The Law of "Public Use" and "On Sale": Past, Present and Future, 72 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 114, 129-151 (1990); Rooklidge & von Hoffman, supra note 8, at 11-
23; 2 CmsuM, supra note 14, §§ 6.02[2],[5-7].
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however, that some of these principles may appear less than consistent
in their application when viewed in light of the specific facts and cir-
cumstances of individual cases.52
1. ON SALE GENERALLY
The determination of whether an invention is on sale, for purposes
of section 102(b), is a question of law. 3 A completed sale, in the sense
that title passes from the seller to a buyer,54 is not required to implicate
the on sale bar. Instead, a mere offer to sell the invention prior to the
critical date,55 regardless of whether the offer is accepted or rejected, is
enough to bar the issuance of a patent.5 6 In fact, a single offer to sell
prior to the critical date may be sufficient to invoke the on sale bar of
section 102(b).17 The inventor's offer to sell, however, must be objec-
tively manifested as a definite offer to sell the invention. The subjective,
uncommunicated, and ultimate intention of the offeror is not, in itself,
sufficient to raise the bar.58 In determining whether an offer to sell was
made, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the offer must be
examined59 because the policies underlying the on sale bar, in effect,
define it.60
The actual sale or offer to sell, however, must occur between two
legally separate entities for the bar to arise. 61 An assignment or sale of
rights in the invention or potential patent rights in the invention, prior to
the critical date, is not a "sale" within the meaning of section 102(b).62
Conversely, the existence of a sales contract or the signing of a purchase
agreement for the invention itself, prior to the critical date, is violative of
52. See discussion infra parts III.C-D.
53. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc. 984 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2346 (1993); Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574
(Fed. Cir, 1990); Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1988); UMC
Elec. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
54. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1990).
55. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56. UMC Elec., 816 F.2d at 653. See Envirotech, 904 F.2d at 1575; In re Caveney, 761 F.2d
671, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
57. Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at 1188; Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970
F.2d 834, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992); A.B. Chance Co. v. RTE Corp., 854 F.2d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
1988); In re Caveney, 761 F.2d at 676.
58. Envirotech, 904 F.2d at 1575; RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
59. Envirotech, 904 F.2d at 1574; UMC Elec., 816 F.2d at 656.
60. Envirotech, 904 F.2d at 1574; RCA Corp., 887 F.2d at 1062; Manville Sales Corp. v.
Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
61. Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Caveney,
761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
62. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
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the on sale bar.6 3 Even if an inventor loses money on a sale of the
invention to another party, such a sale may nonetheless give rise to the
on sale bar.64
In contrast, a sale made primarily for experimental purposes, as
opposed to one made predominantly for purposes of commercial profit,
does not implicate the on sale bar.65 Once an invention has been
"reduced to practice," however, an offer to sell or an actual sale of the
invention is no longer justifiable as an experimental use.67 Reduction to
practice, on the other hand, is not a prerequisite to operation of the on
sale bar.68 In other words, if an offer to sell was made prior to the criti-
cal date, the invention does not have to be in its complete and final form
for the bar to operate.
To invoke the on sale bar, the challenger in an interference action
or the defendant in an infringement suit must prove that the complete
invention, as claimed, was embodied in or obvious in view of the item
sold or offered for sale prior to the critical date.69 The purchaser of the
item sold, however, need not have actual knowledge of the embodied
invention at the time of purchase in order for the bar to arise.7°
The challenger to a patent's validity bears the burden of proving
that there was a definite sale or offer to sell more than one year prior to
the filing of the patent application. 7' If the underlying action is based on
an interference or patent infringement, such sale or offer to sell must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.72 If, on the other hand, the
63. Buildex, 849 F.2d at 1464.
64. United States Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
65. Id. at 716; Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir.
1990); UMC Electronics Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1025 (1988). The topic of experimental use is discussed in greater detail, infra part
III.B.3.
66. "Reduction to practice" is a term of art which means that an actual physical embodiment
of an invention has been built that contains all elements of the claim set forth in the application for
patent. See RCA Corp. v. Data Gen., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1989); UMCEiec., 816 F.2d
at 652.
67. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1480 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
RCA Corp., 887 F.2d at 1061.
68. UMC Elec., 816 F.2d at 656. The court, however, limited its holding to the on sale bar,
noting that "[t]he public use bar of section 102(b) implicates different considerations and nothing
said here should be construed to encompass that part of the statute." Id. at 652 n.5. Thus, the
issue remains open as to whether reduction to practice is a prerequisite of the public use bar.
69. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992); UMC Elec., 816 F.2d at 656.
70. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g., Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990); King
Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986).
71. Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1988); UMC Elec.,
816 F.2d at 656.
72. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 836; Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 1261,
1263 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir.
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inventor is challenged by the Patent and Trademark Office during the
prosecution of his patent application, the appropriate burden of proof is
the lower preponderance of the evidence standard.73 Once facts evi-
dencing prior on sale activity are established by the challenging party,
the patent owner has the burden of coming forward to explain the cir-
cumstances which otherwise appear to be motivated by commercial
objectives outside the one-year grace period provided by section
102(b).
74
Notwithstanding the above rules of law, there is undoubtedly a
degree of uncertainty, on the inventor's part, as to which activities the
court will deem to place an invention on sale within the meaning of
section 102(b). 75 At least one judge on the Federal Circuit has made
note of this incertitude, recognizing that the court itself tends to compli-
cate the matter by applying any one of three different tests to determine
whether on sale activity has occurred.76 These alternative inquiries are
as follows:
1. (A) the claimed invention must have been embodied in or obvious
in view of the subject matter of the sale;
(B) the invention must have been tested sufficiently to verify its
operability; and
(C) the sale must have been primarily for profit rather than exper-
imental purposes.77 Or,
1990); Envirotech, 904 F.2d at 1574. The rationale for applying the clear and convincing standard
of proof arises from 35 U.S.C. §'282 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993), which provides in pertinent part:
"A patent shall be presumed valid.... The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any
claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity." See Buildex, 849 F.2d at 1463.
73. In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
74. UMC Elec., 816 F.2d at 656.
75. See David W. Carstens & Craig Allen Nard, Conception and the "On Sale" Bar, 34 WM.
& MARY L. Rav. 393, 398 (1993) (each Federal Circuit decision analyzing the on sale bar
"involved a different panel of three judges, and each panel analyzed the 'on sale' bar differently");
West & Linck, supra note 51, at 115 (the Federal Circuit's totality of the circumstances approach
tends to result in unpredictability); Stephen R. Schaefer, Comment, Envirotech Corp. v. Westech
Engineering, Inc.: The On-Sale Bar to Patentability and Executory Sales Offers, 75 MINN. L.
Rav. 1505, 1508 (1991) (noting that some commentators criticize the Federal Circuit's application
of the on sale bar because it lacks predictability, fails to inform inventors how to behave, fails to
inform lower courts how to invoke the bar, and thus generally encourages litigation); Michael R.
Schacht, Note, UMC Electronics v. United States: Should Reduction to Practice be a Requirement
of the On Sale Bar?, 12 U. PUGET SounD L. Rav. 131, 152-53 (1988) (the Federal Circuit's use of
the totality of the circumstances test to determine on sale activity fails to provide lower courts,
patent attorneys, and inventors with guidance as to when the on sale bar is triggered). Atlantic
Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1483 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
76. See, e.g., Atlantic Thermoplastics, 5 F.3d at 1482-83 (Rader, J., dissenting).
77. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 859-60 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); see also Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach.,
Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 835-37 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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2. (A) there must have been a sale or definite offer to sell the inven-
tion more than one year prior to the critical date;
(B) there must be evidence that the thing sold or offered for sale
anticipates or renders obvious the later-claimed invention; and
(C) the court will weigh all of the circumstances surrounding the
sale or offer in light of the underlying policies.7" Or,
3. the court will go straight to a weighing of the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" because the policies underlying the "on sale" bar, in
effect define it.79
It becomes apparent after contemplating these various tests that the
inventor is placed in a considerable dilemma when attempting to predict
what the court will consider to be on sale activity or even how the court
will go about reaching such a decision. Nevertheless, he must make
such a prediction if he intends to publicly distribute his invention in any
fashion prior to the critical date, or risk being barred from obtaining a
patent or having his patent subsequently invalidated in a later interfer-
ence or infringement action.
2. PUBLIC USE GENERALLY
"The essence of 'public use' is the free and unrestricted giving over
of an invention to a member of the public or to the public in general."
80
In other words, if an inventor gives or sells his device to another without
limitation, restriction, or injunction of secrecy, the use of such invention
will be considered public, even though the use and knowledge of the use
may be confined to only one person.8 ' The mere presence or absence of
an express confidentiality agreement, however, is not determinative of
whether a given use will or will not be considered public within the
meaning of section 102(b).8 2 Private use of one's own invention, on the
other hand, will not be deemed a public use. 3 It must be made clear that
it is not public knowledge of the invention that precludes the inventor
from obtaining a patent, but rather a public use or sale. 4 In fact, a
78. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 5 F.3d at 1483; see UMC Elec., 816 F.2d at 656.
79. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 5 F.3d at 1483; see, e.g., Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount
Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
80. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting,
with approval, the district court below, 594 F. Supp. 1420, 1427 (D. Del. 1984), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1030 (1987).
81. Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881); Grain Processing Corp. v. American
Maize-Prods., 840 F.2d 902, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134 (Fed.
Cir. 1983)); Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1266 (quoting Egbert, 104 U.S. at 336).
82. Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1266; TP Labs. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965,
972 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
83. See Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1265-66.
84. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 136 (1877); TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 970 (quoting
Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 136).
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commercial use of the invention, even if the invention is kept secret, will
generally be considered public for purposes of the statute.8 5
As with on sale activity, the totality of the surrounding circum-
stances must be taken into consideration in determining whether a given
use should be deemed public for purposes of section 102(b).8 6 In addi-
tion, the party challenging the patent's validity in an interference pro-
ceeding or infringement action bears the burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the invention was in public use prior to the
critical date.
8 7
3. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE DOCTRINE
The essence of the experimental use doctrine is that the pre-critical
date use of an invention by the inventor himself, or anyone under his
direction and control, in order to bring the invention to perfection or to
ascertain whether it will answer its intended purpose, should not be
deemed a transgression of the statutory on sale or public use bars. 8 In
other words, the doctrine's principal function is to mitigate the inflexible
nature of the statutory one-year grace period of section 102(b). The
United States Supreme Court fully embraced this doctrine in the time-
honored case of Elizabeth v. Pavement Co.
8 9
The invention at issue in Elizabeth was a method of constructing
pavement utilizing wooden blocks on a base foundation of tar paper. In
order to test the durability and usefulness of the pavement, the inventor
constructed a seventy-five foot length of the pavement near a toll booth
on a public road. This location was chosen because the inventor knew it
to be well travelled by heavily loaded wagons. The inventor observed
the area where the test pavement was placed on a near daily basis, for a
period of approximately six years. The Court, in upholding the validity
of the patent, held such use to be wholly experimental and thus not a
"public use" within the meaning of the statute. Of particular importance
to the Court was the nature of the invention. It noted that the nature of
85. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1004 (1985).
86. United States Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 391 (quoting TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 972).
87. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems. Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Moleculon
Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
88. See Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 134-37; Labounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1071 (Fed. Cit. 1992); Baker Oil Tools, 828 F.2d at 1563; Pennwalt
Corp. v. Akzona, Inc., 740 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
89. 97 U.S. 126 (1877). This case continues to have a lasting influence on the Federal
Circuit. See, e.g., Manville, 917 F.2d at 551; Baker Oil Tools, 828 F.2d at 1563; TP Labs. v.
Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 970-71 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
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street pavement is such that it cannot be experimented upon satisfacto-
rily except in public.90
The Court set forth the following rationale for the experimental use
doctrine:
When the subject of invention is a machine, it may be tested and
tried in a building, either with or without closed doors. In either case,
such use is not a public use, within the meaning of the statute, so long
as the inventor is engaged, in good faith, in testing its operation. He
may see cause to alter it and improve it, or not. His experiments will
reveal the fact whether any and what alterations may be necessary. If
durability is one of the qualities to be attained, a long period, perhaps
years, may be necessary to enable the inventor to discover whether
his purpose is accomplished. And though, during all that period, he
may not find that any changes are necessary, yet he may justly be
said to be using his machine only by way of experiment; and no one
would say that such a use, pursued with a bona fide intent of testing
the qualities of the machine, would be a public use, within the mean-
ing of the statute. So long as he does not voluntarily allow others to
make it and use it, and so long as it is not on sale for general use, he
keeps the invention under his own control, and does not lose his title
to a patent.
It would not be necessary, in such a case, that the machine
should be put up and used only in the inventor's own shop or prem-
ises. He may have it put up and used in the premises of another, and
the use may inure to the benefit of the owner of the establishment.
Still, if use under the surveillance of the inventor, and for the purpose
of enabling him to test the machine, and ascertain whether it will
answer the purpose intended, and make such alterations and improve-
ments as experience demonstrates to be necessary, it will still be a
mere experimental use, and not a public use, within the meaning of
the statute.9'
The Federal Circuit continues to employ the experimental use doc-
trine, as set forth in Elizabeth, for the purpose of giving inventors time
to perfect their inventions, where legitimately necessary, beyond the
express one-year grace period permitted by section 102(b). The court,
however, rarely extends the doctrine for the benefit of inventors, 92 typi-
cally finding some commercial motivation-and accordingly, a viola-
tion of section 102(b)-in a majority of situations. The following is a
brief synopsis of the Federal Circuit's law of experimental use.
90. Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 134.
91. Id. at 134-35.
92. See 2 CHISUM, supra note 14, § 6.02[7], at 6-83 ("The [experimental use] doctrine is a
difficult one to apply in actual cases. It is frequently evoked by patent holders to avoid the
statutory bar but is rarely sustained by the courts.").
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In order to determine whether a given use was experimental, the
court will generally consider the totality of the circumstances relating to
the character and extent of commercial activities along with the charac-
ter and extent of bona fide experimentation.93 The court, in weighing
these two factors, requires that the public use, sale, or offer to sell is
"substantially for the purpose of experiment" as opposed to "mainly for
the purposes of trade or profit. 94
The factors which the court generally accords the most weight in
making a determination as to whether the public use or on sale activity
was "substantially for the purpose of experiment" are: (1) the amount of
control retained by the inventor over the operation; (2) the extent of
public testing in relation to the nature of the invention; (3) the length of
the test period; (4) whether any payment was made;95 (5) whether there
was a secrecy obligation involved; (6) whether progress records were
kept; (7) who conducted the experiments; and (8) the degree of commer-
cial exploitation during the tests in relation to the purpose of the experi-
mentation.96 The most significant and heavily weighted of the above
factors is the first, the amount of control that the inventor maintains over
the use and operation of his invention.97
A use or sale will not be considered experimental unless those
using or purchasing the invention are aware of the experimentation at
the time of the use or sale. 98 Additionally, the inventor's subjective
belief that his activities were carried out for experimental purposes is
considered irrelevant by the court in making a subsequent determination
of whether the use was experimental.99
The Federal Circuit has recognized that an inventor may need to
93. See Baker Oil Tools, 828 F.2d at 1563; Western Marine Elec., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co.,
764 F.2d 840, 845 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
94. Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256 (1887); see Paragon Podiatry
Lab., Inc. v, KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Labounty Mfg., Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Baker Oil Tools, 828
F.2d at 1563 (quoting Smith & Griggs, 123 U.S. at 256).
95. Although payment is an important factor to be taken into account, it does not per se give
rise to the on sale or public use bars of section 102(b). See Baker Oil Tools, 828 F.2d at 1564; TP
Labs., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971-72 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 826 (1984).
96. Baker Oil Tools, 828 F.2d at 1564 (citations omitted); see also Labounty Mfg., 958 F.2d at
1071; United States Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
97. See Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 136 (1877); Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at
1187; Envtl. Prods., 911 F.2d at 717; Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261,
1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
98. See Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at 1186; Labounty, 958 F.2d at 1072 (The "[inventor's
failure to communicate to any of the purchasers or prospective purchasers of his device that the
sale or offering was for experimental use is fatal to his case.") (citation omitted).
99. Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at 1186 (quoting TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 972); Labounty Mfg.,
958 F.2d at 1071; TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 972.
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engage in customer testing1°° to perfect his invention but has limited the
types of permissible testing. The court will not forgive as experimental
the testing of a device to determine suitability for a particular customer's
specific needs.'01 Furthermore, the experimental use doctrine does not
encompass market testing, as such testing is presumed to be commer-
cially motivated.102 Even testing to satisfy federal regulatory procedures
is not per se experimental for the purpose of avoiding the statutory
bars.1
0 3
The court has recognized that an invention can exist at the critical
date for purposes of applying the statutory bars even though the inven-
tion may need to be later refined or improved. 10 The period of permis-
sible experimental use, however, ends once the invention has been
reduced to practice.' 05 In other words, the one-year grace period may
begin to run even before the invention is complete to the inventor's sat-
isfaction. Once the inventor is convinced, or the court finds that he
should have been convinced, that his invention will "answer the purpose
intended," he may no longer be protected by the experimental use doc-
trine. Additionally, the experimental use doctrine does not apply to
experiments performed with respect to unclaimed features of an inven-
tion. 10 6 That is, the experimentation must be related solely to claimed
attributes of the invention which are included in the inventor's applica-
tion for patent.
100. Envtl. Prods., 911 F.2d at 717 ("We recognize that an inventor may need to have a
customer test the invention to determine that it works as intended.").
101. Labounty Mfg., 958 F.2d at 1074 ("It is well settled that 'testing' of a device to determine
suitability for a customer's particular (unclaimed) need is not experimental use which negates
commercialization by the inventor.").
102. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1983). For R discussion on the
interrelationship between the experimental use doctrine and market testing and the general need
for a less restrictive public use bar as applied to market testing of inventions, see generally Jay
David Schainholz, The Validity of Patents After Market Testing: A New and Improved
Experimental Use Doctrine?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 371, 383-86 (1985).
103. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona, Inc., 740 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The fact that
a sale or use occurs under a regulatory testing procedure, such as a FIFRA [Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135] experimental use permit, does not make such
uses or sales per se experimental for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).") (citations and footnote
omitted). For a discussion of the effects of the public use and on sale bars of section 102(b) on
clinical testing of medical devices during the FDA approval process, see generally Eric M. Lee,
Public Use and On Sale Issues Arising From Clinical Testing of Medical Devices, 75 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 364 (1993).
104. Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).
105. RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
106. In re Smith, 714 F.2d at 1136.
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C. An Exposition of Federal Circuit Cases
In practice, the Federal Circuit has had difficulty applying the on
sale and public use bars-and more specifically, the experimental use
doctrine-in a predictable manner. The ensuing case discussions are
structured to provide the reader with an insight into the court's inconsis-
tent treatment of various types of EDIs.
1. ENVIRONMENTALLY DEPENDENT INVENTIONS AND THE NECESSITY
OF PUBLIC TESTING
a. Experimentation or Commercialization? A Very Fine Line
One of the most significant dilemmas faced by inventors of EDIs is
that the testing necessary to establish their inventions' utility often emu-
lates the kinds of on sale or public use activity proscribed by section
102(b). Accordingly, it becomes quite difficult to distinguish between
those endeavors which are commercially motivated and those which are
predominantly experimental in character. If the court recognizes that an
invention, by its nature, requires public testing to perfect, such invention
will likely be sheltered from operation of the statutory bars by the exper-
imental use doctrine. If, however, the court fails to perceive or consider
the environmentally dependent quality of the concerned invention, such
testing will likely be deemed commercially motivated, and hence viola-
tive of section 102(b). The following cases are illustrative.
In Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products,1"7 for
instance, the inventor had shipped, prior to the pertinent critical date,
samples of certain starch hydrolysates to food manufacturers for testing
and ultimately for determination of the product's "utility." The court
found such testing necessary, as "starch hydrolysates may interact
adversely with other food ingredients in the manufacturers' products." 08
Additionally, the court noted that the testing period was short, small
quantities of the samples were shipped, and the samples had been pro-
vided free of charge. 109 Ultimately, the court, in upholding the patent at
issue, found such testing -consistent with experimentation and deter-
mined that there had been no public use in violation of section 102(b).
Conversely, in In re Smith,'1o the Federal Circuit affirmed a deci-
sion of the Patent and Trademark Office rejecting the inventor's claims
for patent pursuant to the public use bar of section 102(b). The inven-
tion at issue was a powdered composition for use as a carpet and room
107. 840 F.2d 902 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
108. Id. at 906.
109. Id.
110. 714 F.2d 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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deodorizer, commonly known as "Carpet Fresh." The inventor had con-
ducted, prior to the critical date, a two-stage consumer test of the prod-
uct involving seventy-six participants. In the first stage of the testing,
the participants viewed a video presentation of the product's intended
application and were subsequently asked various questions about their
perception of the product. The second stage of the test involved actual
in-home usage by the consumers of two different formulations of the
product. The participants were then interviewed for their opinions as to
the product's overall effectiveness, particularly with regard to its
vacuumability.
The majority rejected the inventor's arguments that the testing was
carried out for experimental reasons, finding instead that the dominant
purpose of the tests was market testing, not technological improvement.
The court determined that the operability of the product could have been
sufficiently verified in the laboratory without the assistance of consumer
"housewives.""' In reaching its holding that, prior to the critical date,
the product had been in public use within the meaning of section 102(b),
the majority emphasized the fact that no restrictions had been placed on
the consumers' use of the product."12
Judge Nichols, in dissent, sharply criticized the majority's reason-
ing, 1 3 contending:
What the court is really saying is that the inventor of a product
for use by amateur engineers in the home cannot test the product by
amateur engineers in the home without the occurrence of a 'public
use' starting the year of § 102(b) to run. It appears to me such a rule
is well calculated to thwart and nullify, in the consumer product cate-
gory, the experimental use exception itself.'
In particular, Judge Nichols took exception to the majority's determina-
tion that testing of the product could have occurred entirely within the
laboratory. He felt it "improbable" that such testing would truly reflect
the conditions of consumer home usage."' Additionally, the dissent
111. Id. at 1135-36.
112. Id. at 1136.
113. Id. at 1137-39 (Nichols, Cowen, J.J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1138.
115. On this point Judge Nichols noted:
The majority assumes that all this could have been duplicated in the laboratory ....
The idea that the other tests could have been duplicated in the laboratory seems
highly improbable .... It seems to be supposed that the laboratory technician could
anticipate all the varieties of carpets used in St. Louis homes .... all the varieties of
vacuum cleaners, with their variegated workings and degree of wear and tear; and
all the ways the householder could produce malfunctions by dealing with the
product in an unforeseen manner, with all the brands of engineering ineptitude to be
anticipated in the average home.
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recognized that market testing and product testing, in this instance, were
"inseparable, and each was useless without the other."' "16 Judge Nichols
concluded: "It is the refusal to recognize the existence of these
problems here that divorces the court from reality and produces a deci-
sion that will be quite harmful in its effect.""'
b. Establishing Durability, An Environmentally Dependent Quality
Durability is an ideal example of an environmentally dependent
quality; it is the type of characteristic that can be adequately tested only
in an invention's ultimate operating environment. Additionally, durabil-
ity may be an essential aspect of an invention's claimed usefulness and
effectiveness. This statement is particularly true of devices which are to
be used outdoors, subject to, among other things, changing weather con-
ditions. Problems thus arise where an invention must be publicly tested
in order to establish its durability, and hence, utility. Accordingly,
whether such an invention's patent can withstand a challenge under sec-
tion 102(b) may turn on the court's recognition of durability as an inher-
ent and necessary attribute of the device.
Illustrative of the foregoing is Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount
Systems, Inc., 81 8 which addressed the validity of a patent for a self-cen-
tering luminaire assembly for use on lighting poles. After the device
initially proved operable on a test pole, the inventor contacted a Wyo-
ming State official for possible use of the device at a State rest area. The
inventor sought to establish the device's durability by testing it under the
"wind, cold and corrosive atmospheric conditions"'"19 of its intended
working environment.120 After receiving permission to do so, the inven-
tor installed the device at the rest area prior to the critical date. The rest
area, significantly, was opened to the public subsequent to the critical
date.
The court upheld the patent for the lighting assembly on the basis
that the policies underlying the section 102(b) bars' 2 ' did not support
invalidation on the facts of the case. First, the court noted, the inventor
had done nothing to lead the public to believe that the invention had
116. Id. at 1139.
117. Id.
118. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
119. Id. at 548.
120. It should be noted that the inventor here was under a contractual obligation to supply a
luminaire assembly for installation at the particular Wyoming public rest stop involved and that
another assembly (of different design) had previously been installed by the inventor at the same
rest stop but had since failed. Id. at 547. The court, however, apparently did not find this
sufficient to implicate the on sale bar.
121. See discussion infra part V.A.
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entered into the "public domain." '122 Second, the inventor had not
attempted to extend his patent term by commercially exploiting the
invention prior to the critical date. Additionally, the court found that the
inventor's actions were consistent with the policy "favoring prompt and
widespread disclosure of inventions."' 23 Finally, the court indicated that
when durability in an outdoor environment is inherent to the particular
purpose of an invention, further testing to establish its durability will not
implicate the section 102(b) bars. 24 Accordingly, the court concluded
that experimentation was the inventor's primary motive and thus no pub-
lic use or on sale activity had occurred. On this basis, the inventor's
patent was upheld.
Another case in which an invention's durability was at issue, but
for which its patent was invalidated pursuant to section 102(b), was
Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co.' 25  The patented invention concerned a
method of driving a seed ejector in a row planter.' 26 After the device
had been embodied in a prototype planter, yet prior to the critical date, it
was tested for a period of three years, in several farmers' private lots.
Through this testing, the inventor intended to ensure the "warrantability,
durability, and acceptability of the planter."'"2
In invalidating the patent pursuant to the public use bar of section
102(b), thereby affirming the jury verdict in the district court, the Fed-
eral Circuit set forth the following rationale:
In using the machines to test them for [the inventor], the farmers
served [the inventor's] commercial purposes. [The inventor] has dis-
122. The court observed:
[The invention was mounted atop a 150-foot tall pole in a rest area still closed to
the public, making it very unlikely that the public would even see the new design.
We therefore conclude that there was no conduct by [the inventor) that would lead
the "public" to reasonably believe the invention was in the public domain.
917 F.2d at 550.
123. Id. Of importance to the court's finding was the fact that "[p]rior to its testing in the
winter environment, there really was no basis for confidence by the inventor that the invention
would perform as intended, and hence no proven invention to disclose." Id.
124. Id. at 551; see also Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877) ("If durability is
one of the qualities to be attained, a long period, perhaps years, may be necessary to enable the
inventor to discover whether his purpose is accomplished .... So long as ...he keeps the
invention under his control, [the inventor] does not lose his title to a patent."). But see Paragon
Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1187 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Further testing
simply to determine if the manufacturer/licensee had made the device sufficiently durable--not a
requirement of the claim-is not the type of testing constituting testing to determine if the device
as claimed would work for its intended purpose.").
125. 741 F.2d 383 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
126. A "row planter" is an agricultural machine that, when pulled by a tractor, opens a furrow
in the soil, places seeds at appropriate intervals, and loosely covers the seeds with earth. Id. at
385.
127. Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
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avowed any claim that such use was experimental. [The inventor]
used the farmers as its agents, and the testing of the machines was a
commercial use by [the inventor] of its patented invention., 28
Significantly, the court made no mention of any monetary transaction,
concerning the invention, between the inventor and the farmers or
between anyone else, yet managed to find such use commercially
motivated. 1
29
c. Patient Testing of Medical Devices
Medical devices and pharmaceutical compounds, as previously
noted, are paradigmatic EDIs. Such inventions will very often require
testing in their intended working environment (i.e., on people) in order
to establish their practical utility.3 0 The obvious difficulty with such
testing, however, is that it is undoubtedly public to a certain extent and
may, to the detached observer, appear commercially motivated. Thus,
whether such an invention's patent will be invalidated in an infringe-
ment action by a challenge under section 102(b) is likely to be deter-
mined by the court's assessment of the necessity of public testing of the
device or composition.
For example, the court in TP Laboratories v. Professional Position-
ers, Inc., 31 in upholding the validity of the patent in dispute, determined
that public testing was necessary because of the nature of the inven-
tion. 32 The device at issue was a molded tooth positioning appliance to
be worn by persons undergoing orthodontal treatment. An application
for patent was not filed for the invention until six years after it was first
conceived and embodied in a working prototype. During this six-year
period and prior to the critical date, the invention had been employed in
the treatment of three patients for terms ranging from two months to
approximately fourteen months.
In reaching its decision that the invention had not been in public
use prior to the critical date, the court emphasized that disclosure of the
device could not be avoided because testing of an orthodontic device, by
its nature, has to be public to some extent. 13 3 It was unimportant to the
128. Id. at 391.
129. In fact, the court recognized that the inventor would move the device amongst farmers,
when it was not being used "for a couple of days" in order to keep the device in continuous use.
Id. at 390. This control, retained by the inventor, tends to negate any inference that the farmers
paid the inventor in order to use the device.
130. See discussion supra part II.B.
131. 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
132. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
133. 724 F.2d at 972. The court further recognized that:
[T]he variable of patient cooperation cannot be checked by one patient alone. Use
on three patients is not an obviously excessive number .... Again, as in City of
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court that the doctor had not asked his patients to swear to secrecy as "it
is beyond reasonable probability that a patient would show the device to
others who would understand the function of the [device] or would want
to duplicate the device."'134 The requisite control over the invention was
found to have been established inherently by the dentist-patient relation-
ship. 135 Accordingly, the court applied the experimental use doctrine-
thus negating any purported public use of the device-finding that the
inventor had been testing the device, not the market.
Conversely, the Federal Circuit, in Sinskey v. Pharmacia
Opthalmics, Inc.,136 refused to find the inventor's use of his device
experimental even though the underlying facts were quite similar to
those in TP Laboratories. The invention with which the court was con-
cerned was a surgical loop used to implant intraocular lenses in patients
whose eyes had suffered natural lens damage. The inventor contacted an
outside medical laboratory to prepare drawings of the device and later
purchased three completed lenses from the lab prior to the critical date.
The lenses, however, were not sold commercially until after the critical
date. Additionally, the inventor had, prior to the critical date, implanted
lenses utilizing the loop in question, in a total of eight patients.
Probably the most determinative factor to the outcome of this case
was that the inventor admitted, in a deposition, that no animal testing of
the device was necessary prior to implantation in human beings as he
was sure that it would work as intended, even without such testing. He
subsequently recanted this position in a declaration in opposition to the
Defendant's motion for summary judgment, maintaining that he consid-
ered the implantations to have been primarily experimental.' 37 The Fed-
eral Circuit, however, found his contradictory testimony insufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact. The court determined that the
evidence in the case weighed heavily against experimental use.
1 38
Accordingly it affirmed the district court's dismissal on summary judg-
ment, thus invalidating the patent at issue.
Elizabeth, the test of necessity had to run for a considerable time and on several
patients before the inventor could know whether "it was what he claimed it to be"




136. 982 F.2d 494 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2346 (1993).
137. Id. at 497.
138. The "objective" evidence which the court deemed relevant for determining the absence of
experimental purpose was: the inventor's regular fee was charged for the implantation operations;
he did not inform the patients that they were being treated with an "experimental" lens; he did not
obtain any kind of secrecy agreement from the patients or the surgical staff; and the inventor's
failure to make notations in the patients' medical records about the use of the device. Id. at 499.
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2. TIME FRAMING OF THE INVENTOR'S COMMERCIAL MOTIVATION
The Federal Circuit's often demanding inquiry with respect to
inventors' commercial motivations is not limited solely to the realm of
EDIs. 39 It may, however, present a greater problem for inventors of
such devices where the experimentation necessary to perfect their inven-
tions closely emulates "commercial" activity. The following cases are
illustrative of the court's inconsistent time framing in its application of
the on sale and public use bars.1 ° In certain instances, the court will
employ a broad time frame analysis and strictly scrutinize pre-critical
date non-sale transactions to determine whether the inventor possessed
commercial objectives in violation of the statutory bars. In other
instances, however, the court will apply a more narrow time frame anal-
ysis and disregard, as immaterial, such pre-critical date transactions.
The court, in Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 4 ' utilized a
fairly narrow commercialization time frame in upholding the inventor's
patent in a challenge under section 102(b). The invention at issue was a
three dimensional puzzle comprised of eight cubes in a two by two
arrangement capable of rotational movement. 42 Prior to the critical
date, the inventor had constructed several paper models of his puzzle
and subsequently showed the models to several close friends, explaining
its operation to at least one of them. Later, but still prior to the critical
date, the inventor assigned all of his rights in the puzzle to his employer.
The employer then proceeded to solicit toy and game manufacturers in
an effort to market the puzzle.
The court noted, based upon the personal relationships involved
and other surrounding circumstances, that the inventor had retained suf-
ficient control over the puzzle's use and circulation of information about
the invention. 4 Furthermore, the court found the record to lack any
"hard evidence" of commercialization. 1 " The court determined that a
139. See, eg., supra notes 54-57, 63-64 and accompanying text.
140. For a more in-depth discussion on the general concept of "time framing," see Mark
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 600-
16 (1981) (discussing the relevance and effect of broad/narrow time frames on various doctrines
of the substantive criminal law).
141. 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
142. The puzzle resembled a "Rubik's Cube" with only four squares per face, as opposed to
nine. In fact, the defendant here was the manufacturer of the once popular Rubik's Cube puzzle.
143. 793 F.2d at 1266.
144. Id. at 1267. The court stated:
Although [the defendant] attempts to paint a picture of commercialization from the
discussions between (the employer] and [the inventor], we see only the brush
strokes of speculation.... Discussion between employer and employee does not by
itself convert an employee's private pursuit into commercial enterprise with the
employer. [The defendant] also makes much of a... phone call by [the employer]
to [the potential manufacturer] to see if the latter was interested in receiving a
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mere assignment of patent rights in the invention was not a "sale" within
the meaning of section 102(b).' 45 In sum, the court concluded that no
public use or on sale activity involving the invention had occurred prior
to the critical date.
In UMC Electronics Co. v. United States,146 however, the court
held that the on sale bar was implicated even though the invention, at the
time of the inventor's offer for sale, had not been "reduced to practice."
The device involved was an aviation counting accelerometer (ACA),
which the inventor had designed for the United States Navy for use in its
aircraft. The Navy, in seeking an improved ACA, requested proposals
from various contractors to deliver such a device. The inventor here,
five days prior to the critical date, responded to this request with an offer
to supply over one and one-half million dollars worth of its improved
ACA. It must be stressed, however, that at the time of this offer the
invention had not yet been reduced to a physical embodiment. Nearly
six months later the Navy canceled its earlier request and issued another.
Subsequently, the contract was awarded to another company, with the
inventor receiving no payment whatsoever from the Navy for his
invention.
The court found that the inventor had made a definite offer to sell
the device prior to the critical date and accordingly determined that it
was aprimafacie attempt to commercialize the invention. The majority
concluded that there had been a violation of the underlying policy of
preventing inventors from extending the effective length of their patent
monopolies beyond the seventeen-year term granted by Congress. In
determining that reduction to practice should not be an absolute require-
ment of the on sale bar, the majority stated: "We do not attempt here to
formulate a standard for determining when something less than a com-
plete embodiment of the invention will suffice under the on-sale bar."'
147
Nevertheless, the majority found the device at issue to be sufficiently
complete to warrant application of the on sale bar, thus invalidating the
inventor's patent.
In a forceful dissent,14 8 Judge Smith rebuked the majority opinion,
asserting:
submission of a puzzle idea from an outside inventor. Nothing concerning the
nature or workings of [the inventor's] puzzle was disclosed. (The employer] simply
inquired whether and how an outsider could submit a puzzle for the potential




146. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
147. Id. at 657.
148. Id. at 658 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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It is the users of the patent system who will suffer the impact of
the panel majority decision. The question is not theoretical; it is of
great practical importance.
Those inventors who have sought financing, or who have con-
tacted potential customers, or who have engaged in other normal
business activities before they have made a workable device will not
know the time limit for filing a patent application will be measured or
where the line will be drawn between raw idea and proved invention.
Inventors do not normally try to patent something they have not yet
found workable.... Most inventors do not hire a patent lawyer until
they know they have something that works, by which time, according
to the panel majority, it may be too late.
As the technology community will attempt to cope with this
decision, it perforce will file more "paper patents": patents on
sketchy concepts, before they have been reduced to practice and
before the inventor knows whether or how the invention will work, or
whether it is worth developing.
It is the details of how to make and use an invention that are of
value in the patent disclosure. Bare ideas are not patentable.' 49
In considering the impact that the court's ruling would have on
business generally within the technological community, Judge Smith
continued:
Industry does not commit time and money to the development of
a technological idea without some marketplace investigation. Many
businesses, especially small ones, seek customers for future delivery,
before or while they are working out the technological details. The
patent system should accommodate the ways of the real world, not
place new pitfalls in the way of normal business pursuits.'" 0
149. Id. at 664-65. Judge Smith further stated:
The long history of section 102(b), which effects the irretrievable loss of a valuable
right, shows judicial and congressional recognition of this need for reasonable
certainty.
It was never the purpose of section 102(b) to force premature entry into the
patent system upon inventors who are still developing their inventions. The public
interest is not served by a system that wastes the resources of inventors ....
•.. This requirement for an operable invention is in tune with the purpose of
the patent system to encourage and patent useful inventions, not bare ideas.
Id. at 660 (footnotes omitted).
150. Id. at 665.
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D. The Federal Circuit's Inconsistent Application of the On Sale
and Public Use Bars: A Breakdown of the Experimental
Use Doctrine
As the preceding cases illustrate, the Federal Circuit has lacked
consistency in its application of the on sale and public use bars of sec-
tion 102(b), particularly in its mitigating application of the experimental
use doctrine. The court's analysis of these issues has done little to eluci-
date an area of patent law which requires certainty and predictability to
assist inventors in ensuring patent protection for their inventions, thus
encouraging innovation and the promotion of technological advance-
ment. Instead, confusion remains the central theme, as noted by Judge
Nies in UMC Electronics Co. v. United States:
5
Chief Judge Wright's comments in Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp....
are as apt today as when made in 1961:
"The cases dealing with § 102(b) of the Patent Act are in a state
of confusion resulting in part from an attempt to establish hard and
fast rules of law based upon overly refined legal distinctions. The
area sought to be governed by these rules, however, encompasses an
infinite variety of factual situations which, when viewed in terms of
the policies underlying § 102(b), present an infinite variety of legal
problems wholly unsuited to mechanically-applied, technical
rules."1
52
Unfortunately, this statement remains as applicable today as it was in
1987, when cited by Judge Nies. The Federal Circuit continues, in gen-
eral, to apply rigid rules in determining whether an invention has been
on sale or in public use within the meaning of section 102(b).153 Of
particular importance within the context of this Comment, the court
appears to perceive a bright-line distinction, even where the inventor
himself cannot, between bona fide experimental use necessary to bring
an invention to perfection and the non-experimental use or sale follow-
ing the invention's reduction to practice (i.e., commercial
exploitation).
54
151. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
152. Id. at 654 (quoting Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 815 (D. Del. 1961)).
153. See generally discussion supra parts III.B. 1-2. The irony here is that the court in UMC
Electronics purportedly recognized the validity of Chief Judge Wright's statement that section
102(b) is "wholly unsuited to mechanically-applied" rules, yet in that case it proceeded to apply
just such mechanical rules in determining that the inventor's device in that case had been on sale
prior to the critical date. UMC Elec., 816 F.2d at 654; see infra note 182 and accompanying text.
154. The problem with the court attempting to draw such bright-line distinctions is that there
exists an inherent tension between the ideal set forth in Elizabeth that an inventor should have
time "to ascertain whether [his invention] will answer the purpose intended and make such
alterations and improvements as experience demonstrates to be necessary" and the Federal
Circuit's belief that the inventor's subjective intent to experiment is irrelevant in determining
whether the use was, in fact, experimental. See supra text accompanying note 91 and supra note
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:185
The reasons for the court's inconsistent and unpredictable applica-
tion of the on sale and public use bars and, more specifically, for its
indefinite and varying application of the experimental use doctrine, can
generally be attributed to several underlying factors. The ensuing dis-
cussion highlights some of those factors which appear to contribute to
the court's failure to set forth a body of consistent and reliable precedent
in this area.
First, the court at times fails to distinguish between strictly autono-
mous and environmentally dependent inventions (and their divergent
need for public testing) in determining whether an activity has been car-
ried out primarily for experimental or commercial purposes. In the case
of In re Smith,' 5 for example, the court did not find significant the fact
that the powdered carpet composition at issue was ultimately to be used
in dissimilar environments and that it may, in fact, react adversely or
ineffectively under such diverse working conditions (i.e., with varying
carpets and vacuum cleaners). Rather, the court concluded that all test-
ing necessary to perfect the composition should have been performed in
the inventor's laboratory, instead of in the homes of participants
involved in the study. 1
56
As the dissent in Smith emphasizes, the chief difficulty with the
majority's position is its perfunctory assumption that all such testing
could have been adequately performed in a laboratory setting.' 57 This
supposition may hold true with respect to certain autonomous inven-
tions, such as stereos or television sets which function wholly indepen-
dently of their environment, but is categorically untrue of EDIs which,
by their nature, react dependently with their environment. 5 '
As a direct consequence of failing to perceive the composition as
environmentally dependent, the Smith majority asserted that the "domi-
nant" purpose of the study was market testing and hence, commercially
99 and accompanying text. "Experience" as used by the Court in Elizabeth undoubtedly implies
the inventor's experience, not the Court's. Thus, it is the inventor's knowledge and experience
which is relevant to determining whether additional experimentation is necessary to perfect his
invention and, accordingly, the inventor's "subjective" intent is highly germane to a finding of
experimental purpose.
155. 714 F.2d 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
156. Id. at 1138.
157. Id. at 1138.
158. In other words, a battery operated radio (reception aside) will operate similarly in both the
frozen wastelands of the North Pole and the jungles of Malaysia whereas a pharmaceutical (the
paradigm example of an EDI) will function slightly, if not dramatically, differently on various
individuals. In In re Smith, the carpet powder was an EDI in that it could vary in effectiveness
depending on the type of carpet and/or vacuum cleaner used. To test all possible combinations in
the laboratory would be both costly and time consuming. Thus, the most efficient method of
assuring the invention's effectiveness in the breadth of settings in which it is to be used, is to
perform the type of mass consumer testing that was carried out here.
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exploitative. Implicit in this analysis is the court's unstated belief that
any product testing outside of the laboratory and involving members of
the public is predominantly motivated by commercial objectives. This,
of course, is not necessarily true and altogether ignores the realities of
experimental testing of EDIs. 159 The difficulty inherent in these situa-
tions is that such experimental testing may, at first glance, closely emu-
late on sale or public use activity-or, more specifically, market
testing-in that seemingly subjective consumer responses are taken into
account in determining the overall effectiveness and utility of the inven-
tion.160 In some situations, market testing and experimental product
testing truly are, as Judge Nichols stated, "inseparable."' 16 1 This fact,
however, as implicitly recognized by the court in Grain Products,
162
should not deprive inventors of EDIs their right to patent protection.
In Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co.,' 63 as in Smith, the Federal Circuit
failed to distinguish between the necessity of public testing for EDIs
(where such testing may be essential to establishing the device's utility)
from that necesary for strictly autonomous inventions (where such usage
may simply be indicative of the inventor's commercial objectives). The
invention in Kinzenbaw, a tractor-mounted planting device, was clearly
one that's effectiveness with continued operation depended upon its sur-
roundings. It could not be properly tested in a laboratory and necessar-
ily required testing in its intended working environment to establish its
utility. In fact, durability, which was at the heart of the inventor's test-
ing here, is a paradigm example of an essential quality which is verifia-
ble only in an actual, non-simulated working environment.' 6
159. It is true that some EDIs may be fully tested in a laboratory setting where all situations
critical to the device's effectiveness can be readily simulated, e.g., heat, cold, etc. However, such
contrived situations are quite limited in scope and are generally not acceptable for determining the
functionality of more complex inventions.
160. In essence, the consumers are, in Judge Nichols' words, "amateur engineers." In re
Smith, 714 F.2d at 1138. Their responses as to the perceived functionality of the invention are not
necessarily less viable than responses of engineers or technicians in the laboratory, and in some
circumstances may be more telling. At some level, any such determination as to the device's
effectiveness, whether by engineer or consumer, will appear partially subjective in nature.
Accordingly, there is no rational basis for distinguishing the resulting data by the actor who
obtained the results. In other words, merely because the perceived operativeness of a device is
determined by a consumer is no reason to automatically assert "market testing" as the primary
objective.
161. In re Smith, 714 F.2d at 1139.
162. 840 F.2d 902 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
163. 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
164. See Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877) (The Court, recognizing the
importance of ensuring an invention's durability through extensive testing in its intended working
environment, stated: "If durability is one of the qualities to be attained, a long period, perhaps
years, may be necessary to enable the inventor to discover whether his purpose is accomplished.").
See discussion supra part III.C. 1.b.
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The most efficient method of performing such experimentation, in
this instance, was to have independent farmers test the device in their
own fields (i.e., the intended working environment). Only in this man-
ner could the inventor be assured that the device would be functional
and effective in every possible operating environment. Significantly, the
court referred to the farmers as the inventor's "agents,"'165 which appears
to cut against a finding that the farmers' use was commercially moti-
vated and hence a public use within the meaning of section 102(b).
Nevertheless, the Kinzenbaw court, in striking down the inventor's pat-
ent pursuant to section 102(b), apparently failed to recognize the impor-
tance of affording the inventor an opportunity to establish the durability
and utility of its EDI in the invention's intended and ultimate working
environment without being subject to the public use bar.
166
Likewise, the court in Sinskey v. Pharmacia Opthalmics, Inc., 6 7 in
contrast to its earlier decision in TP Laboratories,68 disregarded the
environmentally dependent nature of the subject invention, holding that
the circumstances surrounding the invention's implantation on patients
did not support a finding of experimental use. In fact, the medical
device at issue in Sinskey is an ideal example of an EDI which requires
public testing to establish its utility and effectiveness.
The most troublesome aspect of the Federal Circuit's analysis in
Sinskey is that it never actually specifies which section 102(b) bar, the
on sale bar or the public use, was responsible for invalidating the inven-
tor's patent.'69 This distinction clearly should have been made by the
court because the facts of the case do not seem manifestly dispositive of
either. There does not appear to be any activity by the inventor which
would constitute a sale under section 102(b). Certainly, a purchase by
the inventor of his own invention from an outside laboratory responsible
for its fabrication cannot be deemed such a sale. The fee received for
surgical implantations of the device was the inventor's standard service
fee and not a sale of the invention itself; in fact, the nature of the pay-
165. See supra text accompanying note 128.
166. But see Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 551 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(where the court upheld the inventor's right to test his invention's durability in its intended
working environment, stating: "[M]erely because [the inventor] also tested the invention briefly in
Ohio does not mean [the inventor] had ascertained whether the invention was operable for its
intended purpose in its intended environment.") (emphasis added).
167. 982 F.2d 494 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2346 (1993).
168. 724 F.2d 963 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
169. The court simply stated: "[The challenging party] has thus met its burden of establishing
a prima facie case of invalidity under section 102(b) because the patented lenses were in public
use or on sale more than one year before the patent application was filed." Sinskey, 982 F.2d at
498 (emphasis added). The disjunctive form of this statement leaves it unclear which statutory
bar, on sale or public use, the court considered applicable. This distinction is more than mere
semantics as the applications of the two bars are different and apply in separate contexts.
[Vol. 49:185
ENVIRONMENTALLY DEPENDENT INVENTIONS
ment was no different than that charged by the inventor in TP Laborato-
ries, where no sale was found.1 70 Accordingly, there does not appear to
be any commercialization of the invention which would tend to impli-
cate the underlying policies of the on sale bar. Furthermore, contrary to
the opinion of the court, there does not appear to be a plainly obvious
public use of the invention in this case. The facts here, with respect to
the patient implantations, are virtually identical to those in TP Laborato-
ries, where no public use was found.' 7'
Although the court in Sinskey does not expressly indicate whether it
is considering application of the public use or on sale bar, it nevertheless
places the burden on the inventor of presenting sufficient evidence of
experimental purpose to raise a genuine issue of material fact.' 72 This,
however, seems an improper shifting of the burden of production as it
appears questionable that the challenger had met its burden of establish-
ing a prima facie case that the invention was, prior to the critical date, on
sale or in public use within the meaning of section 102(b).' 73 Thus,
although no issue of material fact was raised by the inventor, the deter-
mination that the invention had been on sale or in public use as a matter
of law remains questionable in light of the TP Laboratories decision.
Smith, Kinzenbaw, and Sinskey each illustrate an additional prob-
lem with the court's application of the experimental use doctrine. It
appears evident that the court perceives itself, as opposed to the inven-
tor, as the proper party to determine whether extensive public testing
was necessary to perfect a given invention. The court essentially disre-
gards the inventor's expertise and propinquity to his invention in ascer-
170. The court in TP Laboratories noted that "[tihere is no evidence that [the inventor]
charged patients specifically for any [of the inventions]. With two of the three patients, [the
inventor] followed its regular practice of setting a fixed fee for professional services, which
included the necessary appliances." TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 968. Thus, the court determined that
use of an invention which is merely incidental to a professional service is not a sale for purposes
of section 102(b). This is precisely the situation in Sinskey. Therefore, the surgical fee charged in
Sinskey, in accordance with the precedent of TP Laboratories, should not have been deemed a sale
for purposes of section 102(b).
171. See TP Labs., 724 F.2d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
172. Sinskey, 982 F.2d at 498.
173. As the court noted in TP Laboratories:
[I]t is incorrect to impose on the patent owner... the burden of proving that a
"public use" was "experimental." These are not two separable issues. It is incorrect
to ask: "Was it public use?" and then, "Was it experimental?" Rather, the court is
faced with a single issue: Was it public use under § 102(b)?
Thus, the [district] court should have looked at all the evidence put forth by
both parties and should have decided whether the entirety of the evidence led to the
conclusion that there had been "public use."... [I]f a prima facie case is made of
public use [by the challenger], the patent owner must be able to point to or must
come forward with convincing evidence to counter that showing.
724 F.2d at 971 (footnote omitted).
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taining whether sufficient testing had been conducted to ensure that the
invention will answer its intended purpose. 174 Such a retrospective and
removed "objective" determination of experimental use by the court,
however, cannot be considered an ideal method for ascertaining the
validity of an inventor's patent or his right thereto. 175
Another reason underlying the court's apparent failure to equitably
apply the experimental use doctrine is its overly broad time framing with
respect to the inventor's commercial objectives. In other words, the
court will, on occasion, look to the inventor's profit motive at some
unspecified point in time following the critical date, instead of examin-
ing whether the inventor actually received any payment during the statu-
torily proscribed period prior to the critical date.
In UMC Electronics v. United States,176 for instance, the court uti-
lized an exceedingly broad commercialization time frame analysis. It
looked far beyond the date of the inventor's initial proposal to the Navy
to determine whether a profit was expected at any time, irrespective of
the critical date. The inventor in that case, merely five days prior to the
pertinent critical date, had offered to supply his invention to the Navy at
some indeterminate point in the future. 177 At the time this offer was
made, the invention had not yet been reduced to practice. Furthermore,
the proposed sale to the Navy never materialized. There was no actual
sale, no passage of title ever occurred, and no money ever changed
hands. Yet, the court found the offer to be commercial activity in con-
travention of the policies underlying section 102(b). This begs the ques-
tion: Should a mere proposal to supply an invention to another party at
an unspecified date in the future which never materializes into a com-
pleted transaction and from which no profit is ever realized be consid-
ered "commercial activity," thus offending the underlying policies of the
on sale bar resulting in the inventor's complete and irretrievable loss of
the right to a patent? This defies one's basic intuition and sense of
equity. 17
174. See cases cited supra note 99 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 154.
176. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
177. Id. at 650.
178. In fact, under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), revenue from a sale of
goods should not be "booked" until there has been an actual market transaction. That is to say,
regardless of an outstanding offer to purchase, the seller cannot book revenue from a sale until
passage of title to the goods has taken place. GAAP requires that any such transaction be
sufficiently firm before it is entered on the income statement. It is apparent in UMC Electronics
that this was not the case, as the sale, in reality, never materialized. Thus, at no time could the
inventor indicate any revenue from the proposed sale on his books. Given this, it defies reason to
categorize the inventor's proposal as the form of commercial activity which section 102(b) was
designed to prohibit. There was never any extension of the inventor's monopoly here.
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Likewise, in Kinzenbaw,79 the Federal Circuit, in holding the
inventor's patent invalid pursuant to the public use bar of section 102(b),
upheld the following jury instruction given in he district court:
[I]f you find that the type of experimentation being done was primar-
ily for commercializing the apparatus or process or toward gaining a
competitive advantage or realizing a commercial gain, then such
work, if it took place more than one year before the filing of applica-
tions on such alleged inventions, makes invalid any patent issuing on
such applications." °
The inherent problem with such a charge is that most inventors seeking a
patent ultimately aspire to commercialize their inventions, gain competi-
tive advantage, and realize commercial profit. Therefore, any experi-
mentation conducted to perfect the invention is necessarily a means to
that end. This is precisely the essence of the patent system. Limited
monopolies, in the form of patents, are granted to inventors to encourage
innovation. The ability to commercialize and profit from an invention is
one of the inventor's rewards for stimulating scientific and technological
advancement.
Both Kinzenbaw and UMC Electronics demonstrate the Federal
Circuit's propensity for excessively broad time framing with respect to
inventors' commercial motivations. Instead of focusing its analysis on
the period of experimentation involved and then making a determination
as to whether the inventor was profiting at that time, the court chooses to
broaden the relevant time period for determining profit motive. It
appears to ask whether the inventor made any effort to secure a profit at
any time in the future while still attempting to perfect his device. If the
court answers this question in the affirmative, the inventor will usually
be found to have a predominantly commercial objective and will thus be
barred, pursuant to section 102(b), from receiving a patent. As dis-
cussed above, this analysis runs counter to the underlying policies and
goals of the patent system and, accordingly, creates a fundamental and
indecipherable tension for inventors, particularly those of EDIs, who are
attempting to perfect their inventions in order to obtain a patent.
Also closely related to the commercialization time framing issue,
the court, as noted by Judge Smith in UMC Electronics,"'1 occasionally
tends to divorce itself from the realities of the marketplace when apply-
ing the experimental use doctrine. Rather than considering the business
practices necessary in research and development today under its "totality
of the circumstances" approach, the court, in UMC Electronics, chose
179. 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
180. Id. at 390.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 148-150.
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instead to mechanistically apply "rules" of law to reach an inequitable
result.18 2 In general, the court deems irrelevant an inventor's need to
secure a customer prior to devoting significant time and resources to the
technological development of an invention (i.e., prior to the critical
date). This practice, however, is quite significant in today's highly com-
petitive marketplace particularly in fields such as military defense con-
tracting, where there is an extremely limited market for the invention.
Another reason for the Federal Circuit's less than satisfactory appli-
cation of the experimental use doctrine is that the court generally fails to
perform an adequate policy-based analysis in each individual case.
Instead, the court appears to presume that the policies underlying section
102(b) have been violated if it perceives that public use or on sale activ-
ity has occurred prior to the critical date.1
8 3
Finally and most importantly, section 102(b) is itself the ultimate
source of the court's inability to consistently and justly apply the on sale
and public use bars. The court, in essence, is compelled to apply
mechanical, bright-line rules because the statute, by its own terms,
requires no less. The one-year grace period of section 102(b) is a bright-
line rule. Regardless of the court's attempt to circumvent this bright-line
mandate via the experimental use doctrine or policy based arguments,
lines will be drawn and mechanical rules applied. This is an unfortunate
consequence of a statute lacking in clarity and design.
IV. THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT OF § 101 AND THE ON SALE AND
PUBLIC USE BARS OF § 102(b): A STATUTORY DICHOTOMY
FOR INVENTORS OF ENVIRONMENTALLY DEPENDENT INVENTIONS
When viewed together, sections 101 and 102(b) present a consider-
able dilemma for the inventor of EDIs. On the one hand, the inventor
must adequately test his invention to ensure that it is sufficiently useful
to satisfy the utility requirement of section 101. Depending upon the
182. UMC Elec. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987). For instance, the Federal
Circuit readily accepted the fact that a mere offer to sell an invention prior to the critical date is on
sale activity within the meaning of section 102(b). See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 56-57 and
accompanying text. The court's rationale for this rule goes something like this: (1) An offer to
sell an invention constitutes commercial activity; (2) Commercial activity prior to the critical date
violates the policies underlying the on sale bar of section 102(b); (3) If the underlying policies are
offended, the bar is thus implicated; (4) Accordingly, an offer to sell the invention prior to the
critical date implicates the on sale bar (i.e., will be on sale activity within the meaning of section
102(b)). This is the rule. The problem with this analysis is that each step in the reasoning process
is subject to error (particularly step one) and will thus offset the legitimacy of the rule as applied
to any given set of facts. As such, unquestioning application of the rule, without further scrutiny,
will lead to illogical (and sometimes inequitable) results such as that reached in UMC Electronics.
183. See infra notes 191-192 and accompanying text.
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nature of the invention and the environment(s) in which it is to be used,
this may require substantial testing, both in terms of time and breadth.
On the other hand, the inventor cannot place his invention on sale
or in public use more than one year prior to his filing if he wishes to
avoid the possibility of subsequent denial or invalidation of his patent.
8 4
If, however, the inventor must test the invention for more than one year
in an environment other than a confidential laboratory setting to reason-
ably satisfy to himself that the device is sufficiently useful-he is con-
strained to optimistically rely upon a later and wholly uncertain finding
of experimental use by either the Patent Office or the court. If such use
or sale of the invention is subsequently found not to have been experi-
mental, regardless of whether the inventor honestly and reasonably
believed it to be, his time and effort will have been in vain as his patent
will be invalidated pursuant to section 102(b).
Indeed, this situates the inventor between the proverbial rock and a
hard place. He is forced to choose between applying preliminarily for a
patent, that is, before he is convinced that the device is useful, either to
his subjective standards or those of the Patent Office and applying late
for a patent (i.e., more than one year after public testing began), know-
ing that the invention will function properly for its intended purpose.
Either way, his invention may be subject to a later attack of invalidity by
a contesting party in a patent infringement suit or interference proceed-
ing.' 8 5 If the inventor files too early, he risks rejection by the examiner
in the Patent Office for insufficient utility under section 101. Even if the
patent is granted on an insufficient showing of practical utility, its valid-
ity may be challenged, and hence the patent invalidated, in a later
infringement action or interference. If, conversely, the inventor files his
application too late, he risks rejection of his application for violating the
section 102(b) bars. Again, even if the patent is granted, it may be chal-
lenged in a later infringement action on the basis that the invention was
on sale or in public use prior to the critical date.
These concepts are elucidated by the following hypothetical illus-
tration. Assume that an inventor has developed an orally administrable
pharmaceutical composition which he believes will be effective in
184. The fundamental problem is that both on sale and public use activities are determined
retrospectively by the Patent and Trademark Office or the court. Thus, at the time of
experimentation, the inventor has no way of knowing whether his activities will be deemed to
violate section 102(b) at either the time of application for patent or in a later infringement action.
185. See, e.g., Sinskey v. Pharmacia Opthalmics, 982 F.2d 494 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding the
inventor's patent invalid under section 102(b), in a patent infringement action, on the infringing
party's motion for summary judgment), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2346 (1993); Cross v. lizuka, 753
F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding the validity of the inventor's foreign priority application in
an interference proceeding where the challenging party had asserted that the invention lacked
"practical utility" under section 101).
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preventing the recurrence of a certain form of malignant cancer that is
known to exist only in human beings. The composition has already been
tested on a group of test animals and has been proven reasonably safe
for use in humans. The cancer has a proven recurrence rate of seventy-
five percent during the period eighteen to fifty months following remis-
sion, and a recurrence rate of less than five percent prior to eighteen
months. The inventor is a chemist, not a doctor, and therefore must
enlist the assistance of an oncologist to perform the tests properly.
Additionally, because the inventor is not a large pharmaceutical corpora-
tion, he has limited resources and cannot afford to merely give the
expensive composition away. The oncologist, recognizing the remarka-
ble medical potential of the drug, has offered to pay the inventor at cost
(i.e., the inventor makes absolutely no profit) for the test supply. The
composition is administered daily to a test group of thirty-two patients
who are all in remission from the cancer following extended chemother-
apy. After thirty-six months of continuous treatment, only two patients
have redeveloped the cancer when, without the drug and under the same
conditions, fourteen patients would likely have suffered a recurrence. At
this point, both the inventor and the oncologist are convinced that the
composition is effective and thus useful within the meaning of section
101.
The essential question is: When should the inventor file an applica-
tion for patent? Under current Federal Circuit precedent, if the inventor
were to wait for thirty-six months (the point at which he is certain that
the invention is useful) to file his patent application, it would likely be
rejected under both the on sale and public use bars of section 102(b)
(with the use on patients being considered public and the transfer of the
composition, at cost, to the oncologist being deemed on sale activity).
If, however, he were to attempt to file for a patent prior to the eighteen
month period in which the rate of recurrence was only five percent, there
would be no objective basis whatsoever to conclude that the composition
does or does not possess utility. Therefore, it is quite unlikely that a
patent would issue under these circumstances. Even if the patent were
to issue at that time, it would be subject to invalidation pursuant to sec-
tion 101 in a subsequent challenge by an infringing party.
The determination of when to file a patent application for the com-
position is difficult given the significant time and resources at stake. It
is unlikely that the inventor would pursue such societally beneficial
research unless he felt confident that he would receive the protection of
a patent for his invention. This quandary, however, is one with which
inventors of EDIs are often and unjustifiably faced under the current
implementation of section 102(b).
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One of the primary problems with this statutory Catch-22 is that the
inventor has everything to lose while the challenging party, who may
well be a willful infringer, has everything to gain. In other words, the
inventor who honestly believed that he was working to perfect his inven-
tion may have his patent invalidated following a challenge, under either
section 101 or 102(b), by the defendant in an infringement action. Cer-
tainly, a statutory scheme which tends to benefit infringers over rightful
inventors cannot be the basis of an equitable system of patent rights.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMATION OF SECTION 102(b)
Statutory reformation of section 102(b) is presently necessary, as
the Federal Circuit's application of the experimental use doctrine has
proven unsatisfactory in practice. Neither inventors nor patent attorneys
can reliably predict which activities the court will deem to place an
invention on sale or in public use and which it will consider to be pri-
marily experimental. As a result, inventors wary of having their patents
subsequently invalidated are unnecessarily constrained in the scope of
their testing and may feel compelled to file patent applications prema-
turely, before their inventions have been fully perfected. Because soci-
ety has a legitimate interest in receiving those inventions which have
already been perfected, 1 6 it is essential that the statute itself be modified
to afford inventors a greater period of time (i.e., beyond the current one-
year period) where necessary to perfect their inventions.
A. The Policies Underlying Section 102(b)
The Federal Circuit has consistently recognized four fundamental
policies which underlie both the on sale and public use bars of section
102(b).1' 7 These policies include:
(1) discouraging removal of inventions from the public domain that
the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available;
(2) favoring the prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions;
(3) prohibiting the inventor from commercially exploiting his inven-
tion beyond the statutorily prescribed time; and
(4) allowing the inventor a reasonable amount of time following
sales activity to determine the potential economic value of a
186. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877) ("[It is in the interest of the public,
as well as [the inventor] himself, that the invention should be perfect and properly tested, before a
patent is granted for it.").
187. Although the Federal Circuit has expressly recognized the given policies as underlying
the on sale bar, it has implicitly recognized the same four policies as supporting the public use bar.
See, e.g., Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1990); TP
Labs., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
826 (1984).
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patent.18 8
Although these policies focus on legitimate public concerns and are
genuinely well-intentioned, the on sale and public use bars of section
102(b), as applied to inventors of EDIs, are not efficient or just means of
achieving the desired policy ends. It is apparent that section 102(b),
when employed to effectuate policies one through three above, is overin-
clusive in its operative scope. That is to say, application of section
102(b) will accomplish the desired policy objectives, but at the contin-
ued expense of inventors of EDIs generally.
For example, the aim of policy number one is to discourage the
removal of inventions from the public domain upon which the public has
already come to rely. Section 102(b), however, will operate to invali-
date or prevent patents from issuing for inventions in which actual pub-
lic reliance is not even possible-inventions such as those which are
impossible to duplicate through reverse engineering methods or those
which are so deeply embedded within another device that actual aware-
ness of the invention would be virtually impossible. 8 9 Public reliance,
even for these types of inventions, is generally presumed once the device
has entered the public domain.
Section 102(b) is also overinclusive with respect to policy number
two which favors the prompt and widespread disclosure of those inven-
tions which have proven to be useful and societally beneficial. Specifi-
cally, the on sale and public use bars may be used to invalidate the
patent of an invention which had not yet been shown to possess a spe-
cific utility as of the date one year following its entry into the public
domain. The statute, therefore, assumes that all inventions necessarily
possess some demonstrable and specific utility after the invention has
been in the public domain for a period of one year. This assumption,
however, is not necessarily true.
188. Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990); UMC
Elec. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988);
King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986); In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 550;
TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 968. For a more in-depth discussion of these policies and their evolution
and application, see generally Note, New Guidelines for Applying the On Sale Bar to
Patentability, 24 STAN. L. REv. 730 (1972); William C. Rooklidge, The On Sale and Public Use
Bars to Patentability: The Policies Reexamined, I FED. CIR. B.J. 7 (1991).
189. See, e.g., Hall v. MacNeale, 107 U.S. 90 (1883) (public use found where the invention
was embodied within the construction of a burglar-proof safe even though the safe would have to
be destroyed in order to bring the invention into view); see also Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S.
333, 336 (1881) ("[S~ome inventions are by their very character only capable of being used where
they cannot be seen.., by the public eye.... Nevertheless, if its inventor... allows it to be used
without restriction of any kind, the use is a public one."); Koerhing Co. v. Nat'l Automatic Tool
Co., 362 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1966) ("the fact that an invention is buried within a machine is
irrelevant to a determination of public use").
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Furthermore, considering the Federal Circuit's tendency to apply a
broad time frame analysis to inventors' commercial motivations, the
statute is also overinclusive with regard to the third enumerated policy.
The statute has been used to invalidate patents on the basis of the inven-
tor's commercial ambitions existing prior to the critical date, even
though the inventor had not received any payment for the invention at
that time and thus cannot be said to have extended the effective length of
his patent term.
Finally, with respect to the fourth policy, which is intended to
counterbalance policies one through three, section 102(b) is decidedly
underinclusive, particularly when applied to the testing and perfection of
EDIs. A one-year grace period, irrespective of invention type or other
surrounding considerations, is not necessarily a "reasonable amount of
time ...to determine the economic value of a patent."190 Nor is it
necessarily a reasonable period to test and perfect the device to ensure
its utility prior to seeking a patent. Problems often arise in this regard,
as noted previously, when the testing procedures for EDIs simulate on
sale or public use activity.
Beyond the seemingly over and underinclusive nature of the statute
itself, the Federal Circuit has done little to tighten the loose fit between
the statute and its purported policy objectives. The court, in practice,
tends to recite the stated policies and then determine, in a rather con-
clusory fashion, that the policies have been violated by a given sale or
use without providing further policy-based analyses.' 9' This appears to
stem from the presupposition that the mere application of the statute,
without more, upholds the underlying policies. 92 The difficulty here
190. Envirotech, 904 F.2 at 1574.
191. See, e.g., id. at 1574-75; UMCEIec., 816 F.2d at 652-53; In re Caveney, 761 F.2d at 676;
TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 968. But cf Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 550-51 (The court analyzed each of
the underlying policy considerations in succession with respect to the pertinent facts of the case,
holding the on sale and public use bars inapplicable and upholding the patent at issue).
192. The court implicitly applies an inaccurate syllogism in reaching this conclusion. This is
best illustrated through use of the transitive property of elementary mathematics, that is: if A=B
(step one) and B=C (step two), then A=C (step three). More specifically, if there is a sale or
public use before the critical date, the statute has been violated (step one). Violations of the
statute are necessarily contrary to the policies underlying the on sale and public use bars of section
102(b) (step two). Thus, any sale or public use before the critical date is contrary to the
underlying policies (step three). The problem with this approach is that both steps one and two
are flawed. This will lead to a cumulatively defective step three, the conclusion. The problem
with step one is that the court typically finds most pre-critical date transfers of an invention
between an inventor and another party, regardless of genuine purpose, to constitute on sale or
public use activity. The court's application is, thus, usually too strict. Step two, as discussed
above, is flawed in that it does not efficiently effectuate the underlying policies of section 102(b),
because the statute is both over and underinclusive. Thus, the court's conclusion that a use which
it deems to be a sale or public use is contrary to the policies underlying section 102(b) should not
readily be accepted on its face.
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lies in the fact that the court, with no real congressional guidance, must
attempt to remedy the deficiencies inherent in the statute. 93 Because
section 102(b) is ill-suited to properly effectuate the enumerated policy
objectives, the court's continued use of the present on sale and public
use bars, with its concurrent mitigating application of the experimental
use doctrine, will perpetuate the inconsistencies in the court's precedent
and, moreover, will go beyond achieving the desired policy ends to
cause seemingly inequitable results.
In sum, if the above policies truly reflect Congressional intent,
which continues to be the position taken by the Federal Circuit, then
section 102(b) is an inefficient means by which to achieve those poli-
cies. Statutory change is needed both to better serve the desired policy
ends and to promote fairness among inventors who legitimately require
longer periods of time to perfect their EDIs. In the end, fairness is a
necessary prerequisite in a system designed to stimulate innovation in
the sciences and the useful arts.
B. A Suggested Statutory Amendment
Section 102(b), when examined in light of the Federal Circuit's
application thereof and the inherent conflict existing between it and sec-
tion 101, fails to adequately and equitably effectuate its underlying poli-
cies. The following is a recommended modification of section 102(b)
aimed at ensuring all inventors a sufficient period of time to perfect their
inventions, while remaining faithful to the other policies which underlie
the statute.
First, in addition to the currently existing on sale and public use
bars, a pre-patent application process should be implemented whereby
an inventor could request experimental status for his invention. The
inventor would send to the PTO his preliminary inventive concept (i.e.,
before any particular utility had been demonstrated) on a standard form,
and the PTO would then return notice that the form had been received.
The PTO would not immediately scrutinize the contents of the form, but
would merely date it and file it away. Once the inventor received notifi-
cation, he would then be permitted to test the invention in public without
implicating either the on sale or public use bars. The invention, while
being tested, would be marked with an encircled E (for "experimental
use"), which would be prominently located on the invention's exterior
surface.194 The E would indicate to the public that the inventor had initi-
193. Congress has never defined, for purposes of section 102(b), what precisely is meant by
the terms on sale and public use. As a result, the court has been forced to define these terms on its
own. This, in itself, leads to great uncertainty in the application of the bars.
194. One commentator has proposed a similar marking notice system (i.e., "patent to be
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ated this preliminary stage of the patent process, so that others would not
come to reasonably believe that the invention was freely available. This
procedure would satisfy the first of the statute's underlying policies.
The second stage of this process would entail a subsequent
mandatory filing procedure within one year of the inventor's experimen-
tal status filing. The inventor would, at this stage, file a complete appli-
cation for patent. If the invention is determined to possess sufficient
utility for patentability on the basis of the application, a patent would
issue regardless of the inventor's subjective belief that the invention is
not yet complete. If the application is determined to lack sufficient util-
ity for patentability and the inventor can demonstrate due diligence
(before the PTO) in attempting to perfect his invention, then the inventor
shall be granted an extension on his invention's experimental status. If,
on the other hand, the inventor fails to make such a showing of due
diligence, he should then lose the right to continued experimental status.
More importantly, the inventor should be denied, retroactively, the
experimental status granted under stage one of this proposal.
If the extension is granted, it could have either a set time period of
say, one year, or could be awarded on the basis of invention class and/or
surrounding circumstances. At the end of this extended period, it would
be incumbent upon the inventor to file another patent application in
order to determine whether a particular utility had been established for
his invention. Thus, the process repeats itself until either the invention
is found to possess sufficient utility for patentability or until the inventor
has failed to establish due diligence in perfecting his invention. Once
the invention's utility has been evidenced and a patent consequently
issues, the inventor's seventeen-year patent term would accordingly
commence from that date.
Thus, the second stage of the proposal would encourage both the
policy of favoring the prompt and widespread disclosure of useful inven-
tions as well as the policy of prohibiting an inventor from commercially
exploiting his invention beyond the statutorily prescribed seventeen-year
patent term. An inventor choosing this option would be compelled to
diligently pursue his experimentation for fear of losing his invention's
experimental status retroactively and being subjected to the already
existing on sale and public use bars. It would thus be difficult for inven-
tors to take advantage of this more forgiving proposal in order to extend
the effective length of their patent monopolies. Accordingly, inventors
who genuinely require additional time to perfect their inventions,
beyond that currently afforded by section 102(b), would be permitted to
applied for") to avoid detrimental public reliance on pre-patent inventions placed into the public
domain for experimental purposes. See Schainholz, supra note 102, at 394.
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diligently continue their experimentation until a specific utility can be
demonstrated before the PTO. On the other hand, those who attempt to
take advantage of this statutory experimental status would be subjected
to and unprotected against the currently existing statutory bars.
The following is an encapsulation, in statutory form, of the forego-
ing proposal:
§ 102. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(b)(1) except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this
section, the invention was... in public use or on sale in this country,
more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in
the United States.195
(2) If, prior to placing the invention in public use or on sale
in this country, such person has applied for and received experimen-
tal status for the invention from the Patent and Trademark Office,
paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall not apply, provided-
(A) such person, upon placing the invention into the
public domain, gives proper notice to the public of the invention's
experimental status, 196 and
(B) such person files an application for patent, as pre-
scribed by section 111197 of this Title, within one year of the applica-
tion for experimental status and the conditions of paragraph (b)(3) or
(b)(4) of this section are subsequently complied with.
(3) If, pursuant to section 101198 of this Title, the invention
is found not to be useful at the time of filing of the application for
patent required by paragraph (2)(B) of this section and-
(A) the person demonstrates due diligence in attempting
to establish the invention's usefulness, such person shall receive an
extension of his invention's experimental status for a period to be
established by the Commissioner. Within the prescribed period, such
person shall file an additional application for patent. This procedure
shall continue until either the invention's usefulness has been estab-
195. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). Although the phrase "was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country" is not shown here as part of the proposed section 102(b),
it is nonetheless intended to remain. See id. It was omitted here solely for the purpose of
narrowing the reader's attention to the matter at hand; that is, to the proposed revisions to the on
sale and public use bars of section 102(b).
196. The form of notice contemplated here is similar to that provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 287(a)
(1988), which states: "Patentees, and persons making or selling any patented article for or under
them, may give notice to the public that the same is patented, either by fixing thereon the word
'patent' or the abbreviation 'pat.'." The only difference being that in the case of notice of
experimental status, the required marking should be in the form of an encircled E (similar to the
encircled R used for registered trademarks).
197. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988) (setting forth the specific requirements for the inventor's
application for patent).
198. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See discussion supra part I.
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lished for purposes of section 101 of this Title or the person fails to
demonstrate due diligence in attempting to establish the invention's
usefulness; or
(B) the person fails to demonstrate due diligence in
attempting to establish the invention's usefulness, such person shall
be deemed not to have satisfied the requirements of subparagraph
(b)(2)(B). Accordingly, the limitations of paragraph (b)(1) shall
apply, irrespective of any other actions taken by such person under
paragraph (b)(2).
(4) If, on the basis of such application for patent as required
by subparagraph (2)(B) of this section, the conditions for patentabil-
ity set forth in this Chapter are otherwise met, a patent shall issue for
the invention upon compliance with section 151199 of this Title.
The principal improvement embraced by this revision of section
102(b) is that experimental use is provided for within the statute itself
instead of operating solely as a judicially created exception to section
102(b). The essential difference being that, under this statutory formula-
tion, a more objective basis exists for tracking the inventor's experimen-
tal use of his invention, as the determination of experimental use is made
simultaneously with the invention's period(s) of testing, as opposed to
several years later in an infringement action. This eliminates the retro-
spective approach currently employed by the Federal Circuit in its appli-
cation of the experimental use doctrine. Instead the responsibility of
ascertaining whether an inventor is genuinely testing his invention is
placed upon the PTO, an entity better suited to making such a
determination.
Permitting inventors to demonstrate legitimate experimental pur-
poses until they are able to establish a specific utility for their inventions
while they are in the process of testing, would significantly benefit
inventors of EDIs. In sum, implementation of the above statutory pro-
posal would greatly enhance objectivity and certainty with respect to the
experimental use of EDIs and would thus serve to eliminate the dichot-
omy which currently exists between sections 102(b) and 101.
The greatest drawback of this statutory proposal is the administra-
tive burden which it could conceivably place on the PTO. If all inven-
tors were to file for experimental status as contemplated by the statute,
and then subsequently proceed to file for extensions thereof, the
increased workload on the patent examiners at the PTO would create a
significant burden. The proposed experimental status filing is entirely
optional, however, and it is quite unlikely that more than a small minor-
199. 35 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (specifying the notice of payment and payment requirements for
issuance of a patent following a determination by the PTO that the applicant is otherwise entitled
to a patent under law).
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ity of inventors would choose this route because of the risks involved.
For example, if the inventor places his invention on sale or in public use
before filing for experimental status and thereafter fails to make an ade-
quate showing of due diligence in attempting to perfect his invention on
the date one year after the filing for experimental status, he will be retro-
actively subject to the on sale and public use bars and thus could lose his
right to a patent for his invention. Accordingly, the inventor must make
an honest and reasonable attempt to perfect his invention during this
period.
This system operates as an incentive for the inventor to file a suffi-
cient and complete patent application, thereby discouraging fraudulent
attempts at extension of the invention's experimental status for commer-
cial purposes. Those inventors who do not actually require additional
time to publicly test their inventions beyond the one-year grace period
already provided by section 102(b) will be unlikely to risk losing their
right to a patent altogether. Thus, only those inventors who genuinely
require an extended period of time to publicly test, in order to perfect,
their inventions (i.e., inventors of EDIs), would be willing to undertake
such a calculated risk. As such, the proposed section 102(b) is unlikely,
in practice, to be as administratively impracticable as it may appear.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fundamental objective underlying the patent laws, as set forth
in the United States Constitution, is the promotion of science and the
useful arts.2" Any act of Congress enacted pursuant to this directive, in
order to withstand Constitutional scrutiny, must be an appropriate and
plainly adapted means to this enumerated end.20 ' Accordingly, it fol-
lows that the policies underlying any individual patent statute must nec-
essarily be subordinate to the fundamental goal of promoting scientific
and technological innovation. A statute which, in practice, tends to hin-
der or otherwise undermine this scheme should be modified in part or
repealed altogether.
Section 102(b), to the extent that its application by the Federal Cir-
cuit frustrates this basic Constitutional design (particularly as it is
applied to EDIs), must be modified to better effectuate the goal of pro-
moting scientific innovation. The reasons for the statute's seeming fail-
ure are several. First and most importantly, the statute, in its present
form, affords a fixed one-year grace period irrespective of an inventor's
genuine need to adequately test his device in the public domain. The
court has attempted to remedy this statutory shortcoming through appli-
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
201. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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cation of the judicially created experimental use doctrine. It is apparent,
however, that the doctrine has fallen short of its intended purpose as
inventors are rarely given its benefit by the court, even in those instances
where it may be reasonably necessary for the inventor to perfect his
invention. Accordingly, the statute has operated as a hindrance, and
hence a deterrent, to inventors wishing to satisfactorily test their EDIs.
Additionally, in its present form and application by the court, sec-
tion 102(b)-whether viewed by itself or in conjunction with the utility
requirement of section 101-is a source of great uncertainty for inven-
tors. Inventors and patent counsel alike, under current Federal Circuit
precedent, cannot with confidence know where to draw the line between
raw idea and proven invention. In many instances, this uncertainty leads
to the situation where an inventor, by necessity, extends the period of
experimentation beyond the one-year grace period of section 102(b) in
an honest attempt to perfect the device, only to have a patent subse-
quently denied or invalidated by the Patent Office or the courts because
his use, in retrospect, did not appear experimental. Nothing serves as a
greater deterrent to innovation than denying the well-intentioned inven-
tor, following substantial expenditures of both time and money, the
fruits of his labor. The disconcerted inventor will doubtless be once
bitten, twice shy.
Finally, the Federal Circuit, in its interpretation of section 102(b),
unduly emphasizes an inventor's profit motive, as opposed to actual
profit received, in determining whether the statute has been transgressed.
This analysis ignores the reality that most inventors who seek patent
protection for their inventions ultimately aspire to profit from the result-
ing monopoly. Indeed, this expectation is fundamental to the quid pro
quo contemplated by the patent system. To deny inventors patents, in
order to penalize them for possessing commercial ambitions prior to the
perfection of their inventions, is to. undermine the basic incentive
scheme necessary for the stimulation of technological innovation. Thus,
the court invariably places the policy of preventing an inventor from
commercially exploiting his invention beyond the one-year grace period
specified in section 102(b) above the Constitutional directive of promot-
ing the sciences and useful arts. Undoubtedly, this constitutes a deleteri-
ous reorganization of the Constitutional hierarchy which can be rectified
only through a statutory reformation of section 102(b).
In summation, doctrinal solutions to the inherent imperfections of
section 102(b) have proven unsatisfactory in practice both prior to and
following the inception of the Federal Circuit. The appropriate remedy
is not to be found doctrinally, but rather in fundamental statutory change
of section 102(b). This Comment proposes legislative modification in
1994]
232 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:185
the hope that the ultimate Constitutional objective of promoting the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts can be maintained while remaining
faithful to the policies underlying section 102(b).
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